Innovating SMEs and Regions: The Need for Policy Intelligence and Interactive Policies

Based on the empirical findings achieved through comparative research involving 40 innovation policy instruments from 11 European regions, this paper proposes a shift in rationale and in the broad orientations of innovation policy to focus on addressing SMEs in their regional context. The main role for innovation policy, which aims to increase the capacity of a region and the capabilities of its SMEs to innovate, is to foster interactive learning within the firms and within the region. This calls for an interactive mode of policy intervention. The paper deals also with the question of how to build a coherent portfolio of policy instruments, taking into account both regional situations and specific SMEs needs in terms of innovation. The key message is that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' policy portfolio. Regional differences in innovation capabilities call for a tailored mix of policy instruments. One salient element of the conclusion is the need for more 'policy intelligence' in this complex field.     

An other view of integral futures: De/reconstructing the IF brand

This paper points to some limitations of the narrow version of integral futures (IF) as represented in the recent special issue of Futures (2008, vol. 40, issue 2). I also propose several ways that the IF brand could be refreshed through a broader and deeper approach to integral futures by way of a scholarly engagement with other kindred discourses. The main focus of this paper is to open out beyond the “myth-of-the-given” in relation to the notion of integral and in this way broaden and deepen possibilities for integral futures.     

The optimal sequencing of carrots

When aid organizations contract with local agents aid funds have the potential to be diverted to purposes other than the intended project. A multi-stage game is presented where the benefit from the project is cumulative, with the application of funds in each stage increasing both the agent's and the organization's benefit from the project. As the agent's utility of diversion increases, the allocation in each stage decreases and the project takes more stages to complete. When contracting with agents with high utilities of diversion the optimal contract involves bloated projects and a side payment to the agent upon completion. If the organization's commitment to the contract is not credible both the agent's and the organization's benefit is reduced.