The sweet smell of advertising: the essence of matching scents with other ad cues

New technologies enable practitioners to communicate scents in advertisements on various media. The current research examines the importance of matching scent cues to the advertised product, and the joint effect of scent and other cues such as colour on consumer responses to advertising. A 4 × 2 experimental design was conducted, where participants (N = 603) were presented with scented colour print advertisements. Three hierarchical responses were measured: emotional response, attitude, and purchase intention. Findings reveal that higher congruence between scent and the advertised product heightens positive consumer response. Furthermore, this research stresses the significant joint effect of scent and colour cues, and supports the incongruence approach, suggesting that combining scents that are poorly congruent with other sensory cues enhance consumer response. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.     

Offshoring in the New Global Political Economy

abstract    This essay challenges claims by economists and management scholars that 'offshoring' is simply another form of trade with mutual benefits. I argue that reducing wages through offshoring leads to wealth creation for shareholders but not necessarily for countries and employees, and that many displaced workers have difficulty 'trading up' to higher skilled jobs. Offshoring is a new phenomenon that entails the organizational and technological ability to relocate specific tasks and coordinate a geographically dispersed network of activities. It decouples the linkages between economic value creation and geographic location. The result is the creation of global commodity markets for particular skills and a shift in the balance of market power among firms, workers, and countries.     

Love or Money? The Effects of Owner Motivation in the California Wine Industry

Models that assume only consumer tastes determine the characteristics of supply are restrictive; producers can gain utility from aspects of production and pay for deviating from demand by accepting lower financial returns. We model and measure motivations of California winery owners, and analyze their effects on quality and price. We find utility–maximizers are more likely to produce high quality and set higher quality–adjusted prices. Profit–oriented owners are less likely to produce high quality wines. These results suggest that the presence of hobbyists who enjoy producing high quality may lower financial returns in the segment and discourage profit–maximizers from locating there.     

Accounting Policies in Agencies with Moral Hazard and Renegotiation

We emphasize the role of accounting policies, and their audit, in an earnings management setting. We use a two–period agency in which three frictions interact: the agent privately observes action (or effort) supply and output, and the initial contract is subject to renegotiation. This creates a setting in which both players' behavior is of concern, and, importantly, information rationing is efficient. Moreover, this information rationing is directly interpretable as being produced by an accounting policy whose application is ensured by an auditor.     

ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT AND THE INTERPRETATION OF STRATEGIC ISSUES: A NOTE ON CEOS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT*

This paper explores the relationship between organizational context and the interpretation of strategic issues by examining the hypothesis that CEOs' interpretations of foreign investment in the USA are influenced by the organizational context in which they are embedded. Three aspects of organizational context - the global business experience of the firm; the firm's level of organizational inertia (as represented by firm age and size); and the resources available for responding - are examined as predictors of CEOs' perceptions of foreign investment as a threat or an opportunity. Analysis of data from 320 organizations, controlled by industry, shows that global business experience, firm size, and perceived capability are significant predictors of the perception of threat and opportunity. the discussion addresses the implications of these findings for future research on issue interpretation and organizational context.     

A STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

This research develops and analyzes a theoretical framework for supplier management and customer relationship strategies, supply chain management strategy, and firm performance using structural equation modeling. Data used in the paper were collected from a comprehensive survey circulated to a wide variety of U.S. and European business executives. Based on the findings, a clearer picture of the practice and benefits of SCM and its strategic implications emerges.     

TWO READINGS AND AN EPILOGUE: A COMMENTARY ON THE VOICE OF SEDUCTION IN MYNATTET AL.

Two readings are made of Mynatt, Omundson, Schroeder and Stevens (pp. 657–683). The first reading views the paper through a largely “conventional” social science lens, while the second adopts a more critical perspective which raises three issues: abstraction in research; gender and ethnicity; and the rhetoric of research.     

Do we now collect any revenue from taxing capital income?

The U.S. income tax system has long been recognized as a hybrid of an income and consumption tax system, with elements that do not fit naturally into either pure system. What it actually is has important policy implications for, among other things, understanding the impact of moving closer to a pure consumption tax regime. In this paper, we examine the nature of the U.S. income tax system by calculating the revenue and distributional implications of switching from the current system to one form of consumption tax, a modified cash flow tax.     

Welfare reducing licensing

In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous.