INTERNATIONAL PRICE COMPARISONS BASED UPON INCOMPLETE DATA*

This paper is directed at the following question: given an incomplete set of price data relating to goods or services in some category of output for each of a number of different countries, what arithmetic should be performed on the prices to get a meaningful representation of the relative category price-levels of the countries? In the course of developing an answer to the question, some broader matters are considered and illuminated. A comparison of category price-levels for different countries is analogous to a commonly-encountered problem in many areas, that of ranking ordinally or cardinally in one dimension a group of “entities”—persons, households, firms, industries, etc.—on the basis of sets of measurements associated with the individual entities. It is this point of view which dominates the following presentation.     

Trade Credit Management and the Decision to Use Factoring: An Empirical Study

This paper examines the firm's decision to use factoring amongst a cross-sectional sample of 655 manufacturing companies using a rich firm-level database. The paper develops and tests hypotheses that explain this particular choice of credit and financial management policy. We find strong evidence of a 'financing demand' explanation for the use of factoring, and also some support for theories which relate the decision to use a factor to the firm's product characteristics, to market characteristics and to the preferences of the factor (supply constraints). The motivation to use factoring, however, appears to be related more to a demand for asset-based finance from small companies than to firm-level choices about organisational structure.     

An Empirical Investigation of Trade Credit Demand

This paper investigates the motivations for a firm's demand for trade credit. Demand for credit is modelled as a function of transaction costs motivations, financing motivations, operational considerations, seller compliance issues and supplier marketing, whilst controlling for the firm's business environment and for firm characteristics such as size and industry. This paper builds on previous studies by considering a wider range of factors that can affect trade credit demand holistically on a single sample. It appears that the use of trade credit is widespread, and that it is generally perceived as an important short term financing option, although the availability of trade credit is not a major influence on supplier choice. The level of a firm's trade credit demand is found to be significantly influenced by transaction costs, financing, operational issues, marketing activities by suppliers, the firm's investment in trade debtors and firm size.     

Graphical disclosures by charities: clarification or distortion? The case of the Netherlands

• The literature on graph use and graphical distortions in nonprofit organisations is reviewed, highlighting measurement issues. A sample of 50 disclosed annual reports of Dutch charities containing graphs is analysed, leading to the observation of significant graphical distortions. These distortions seem to be related to organisational efficiency, though not in the way one might expect: better performing charities ‘embellish’ the data in their graphical representations, whereas the opposite seems to be the case for the less performing charities.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“GATT‐think” with Asymmetric Countries*

We argue that a trade agreement which conforms to GATT’s reciprocity rule benefits the (stronger) less trade‐dependent country at the expense of the (weaker) more trade‐dependent country. Reciprocity is so unfavorable to the weaker country that it may be worse off under reciprocity than under the Nash‐ bargaining solution, a “power‐based” approach to trade negotiations that reflects power asymmetries among trading partners. Our results question Bagwell and Staiger’s (1999 , 2000 ) view of reciprocity as a rule that “serves to mitigate the influence of power asymmetries on negotiated outcomes.”     

When financial markets work too well: A cautious case for a securities transactions tax

Unlike most major industrialized nations, the United States does not impose an excise tax on securities transactions. This article examines the desirability and feasibility of implementating a U.S. Securities Transfer Excise Tax (STET) directed at curbing excesses associated with short-term speculation and at raising revenue. We conclude that strong economic efficiency arguments can be made in support of a STET that throws sand into the gears, in James Tobin's (1982) phrase, of our excessively well-functioning financial markets. Such a tax would have the beneficial effects of curbing instability introduced by speculation, reducing the diversion of resources into the financial sector of the economy, and lengthening the horizons of corporate managers. The efficiency benefits derived from curbing speculation are likely to exceed any costs of reduced liquidity or increased costs of capital that come from taxing financial transactions more heavily. The examples of Japan and the United Kingdom suggest that a STET is administratively feasible and can be implemented without crippling the competitiveness of U.S. financial markets. A STET at a .5% rate could raise revenues of at least $10 billion annually.     

The influence of seller learning and time constraints on sequential bargaining in an artificial perishable goods market

This paper investigates the formation of prices in a perishable goods market where agents bargain repeatedly through pair-wise interactions. After extensive field observations, we chose to focus on two aspects that seem important to actors of this market: the passage of time and update in judgement when gathering information. The main feature of the market is that a seller bargaining with a buyer has incomplete information about buyer's willingness to pay and is not sure how her trading partner will evaluate an offer or compare it with other options. On the other hand, buyers have limited time to look for goods and cannot meet all possible sellers before making a decision. Hence agents cannot calculate the best price to offer but receive information through limited interactions, and use this information to choose their actions.An agent-based model was built to represent a framework that mimics the observed market institution and where agent's possible behaviors and learning was made as consistent as possible with gathered data. Simulations were run, first for sensitivity analysis concerning main parameters, then to test the dependance of agents’ learning to (a) the time buyers can spend on the market and (b) the frequency of update in learning by sellers. To validate the model, features produced by the simulated market are compared to the stylized facts gathered for negotiation about four goods. We reproduce the main features of the data on the dynamics of offers, transaction prices and agents’ behavior during the bargaining phases.     

Dysfunctional executive behavior: What can organizations do?

Much has been made of dysfunctional executive behavior in recent years. As such, the purpose of this article is to assist organizations in the design of executive work. To better construct a work environment that diminishes self-serving and unethical behavior, we propose that organizations structure an executive's work around three factors: the accountability environment, managerial discretion, and relationship composition. These factors are used to describe how organizations can better design executives’ work so as to promote more desirable executive behavior. We describe how these factors should be calibrated, as well as how they affect each other.