The Paradox and Constraints of Legitimacy

This article contributes to the literature on legitimacy by highlighting its paradox and constraints. While an optimal level of legitimacy-seeking behaviours may be necessary for organizational effectiveness, an excessive focus on legitimacy may lead to stakeholder mismanagement and have the opposite effect. These insights emerged from a longitudinal qualitative study of large-scale changes in public-sector health care in a Canadian province (1994–2002). In 1994, subordinate health care organizations underwent government-driven reforms to promote market-based logics of efficiency and cost reduction. Initial years post reforms were characterized by a singular focus on government-driven priorities and inattention to other stakeholders. However, instead of giving benefits of legitimacy, these behaviours led to anger and activism from non-institutional stakeholders such as staff and community due to a decline in quality and patient satisfaction. Eventually, greater attention to stakeholder concerns ended the stand-off. These findings also elaborate Suchman’s (Academy of Management Review 20(3), 571–610, 1995) framework on legitimacy and explain that legitimacy may occur for reasons other than institutionalization of values and be temporary in nature.     

New development: Between politics and strategic planning—the management of government priorities in Lithuania

ABSTRACT

How do political agendas impact on strategic planning practices? This article shows that recent changes to the framework for managing government priorities have made Lithuania’s strategic planning system more politically responsive by mobilizing political attention, leadership and state funding to major government commitments. However, these changes have not yet translated into any longer term outcomes because policy implementation practices did not change very much.     

Towards the entrepreneurial university: the principal-agent problem

The purpose of the paper is to explore how an individualized incentive system could increase professors’ motivation to contribute to the university’s mission to become entrepreneurial in transition countries. The paper proposes a conceptual analysis that draws on the principal-agent problem to examine incentives that may stimulate institutional change. It considers the framework of a university becoming entrepreneurial and assumes that the principal is dean while the agent is a professor. It contributes to the national innovation system literature by providing new insights about the institutional change in transition countries. The contribution is threefold: it distinguishes between an ordinary and an entrepreneurial university, it explains relationship between micro and meso levels in the process of institutional change towards entrepreneurial university, it refines knowledge on individualized incentive system acting as a motivation for professors to contribute to university becoming entrepreneurial. The paper challenges studies that dismiss the micro level role of human agency in institutional change. The conceptual arguments have important managerial implications for all public and private institutions.