Asymmetric Price Movements and Borrowing Constraints: A Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model of Crises, Contagion, and Confusion

This study proposes a rational expectations equilibrium model of crises and contagion in an economy with information asymmetry and borrowing constraints. Consistent with empirical observations, the model finds: (1) Crises can be caused by small shocks to fundamentals; (2) market return distributions are asymmetric; and (3) correlations among asset returns tend to increase during crashes. The model also predicts: (1) Crises and contagion are likely to occur after small shocks in the intermediate price region; (2) the skewness of asset price distributions increases with information asymmetry and borrowing constraints; and (3) crises can spread through investor borrowing constraints.     

The Effect of Regulation FD on Transient Institutional Investors' Trading Behavior

We assess the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) on the trading behavior of transient institutional investors in the quarter prior to a bad news break in a string of consecutive earnings increases. Bad news breaks are defined as breaks that are by growth firms, preceded by longer strings of consecutive earnings increases, followed by longer strings of consecutive earnings decreases, and associated with larger declines in earnings. Pre–Reg FD transient institutions have abnormal selling of stocks in the quarter immediately preceding a bad news break. This abnormal selling is confined to firms that hold conference calls in the pre–Reg FD period. However, in the post–Reg FD period transient institutions do not exhibit similar abnormal selling of stocks in the quarter before a bad news break. Furthermore, after Reg FD transient institutions allocate less of their stock portfolios to conference call firms relative to non–conference call firms in the quarters prior to a bad news break. These results demonstrate that Reg FD has had an impact on management's selective disclosure behavior and significantly changed the trading behavior of transient institutions.     

Feedback Effects and Asset Prices

Feedback effects from asset prices to firm cash flows have been empirically documented. This finding raises a question for asset pricing: How are asset prices determined if price affects fundamental value, which in turn affects price? In this environment, by buying assets that others are buying, investors ensure high future cash flows for the firm and subsequent high returns for themselves. Hence, investors have an incentive to coordinate, which may generate self‐fulfilling beliefs and multiple equilibria. Using insights from global games, we pin down investors' beliefs, analyze equilibrium prices, and show that strong feedback leads to higher excess volatility.     

How Informed Are Actively Trading Institutional Investors? Evidence from Their Trading Behavior before a Break in a String of Consecutive Earnings Increases

We examine whether transient institutional investors (i.e., institutions that trade actively to maximize short‐term profits) have information that allows them to predict a break in a string of consecutive quarterly earnings increases and thereby avoid the economically significant negative stock price response associated with the break announcement. We show that transient institutions predict the break at least one quarter in advance of the break quarter. We also provide evidence that is consistent with transient institutions obtaining information regarding the impending break from private communications with management.     

Financial Ratio Adjustment: Industry-Wide Effects or Strategic Management

This paper proposes an alternative model for analyzing financial ratio behavior. The model postulates that (1) firms' financial ratios reflect unexpected changes in industry conditions; and (2) managers attempt to move their financial ratio toward the long-run desirable target. This model is employed to assess the relative weights of financial ratio movement that are associated with these two forces. The results show that changes in financial ratios can be due to both external shocks and strategic adjustment by management. The amount of financial ratio smoothing due to strategic adjustment appears to be substantial. Furthermore, the speed of convergence toward the optimal targets varies across industries and firms of different size.     

From Covert to Overt: Everyday Peasant Politics in China and the Implications for Transnational Agrarian Movements

This contribution spotlights overt collective action as the form of everyday peasant politics in post-socialist China. It first considers the interlinking in the post-socialist period of global neoliberal capitalism and internal (so-called) primitive accumulation by corrupt officials and eager entrepreneurs. Against this background it examines the collective protests of the last 20 years, focusing first on the issue of corrupt local power and then on land seizures. It argues that the emergence of sustained rural contention has been informed by China's socialist legacy as well as older peasant ideologies, and it has involved the coalescence of a shared class perspective among the poor and dispossessed. The final portion of the article considers the implications of these everyday peasant politics, especially land struggles, for transnational agrarian movements.