A political ideology lens on social entrepreneurship motivations

ABSTRACT

The traditional literature regarding social entrepreneurship does not question the political dimension. On the contrary, it tends to de-politicize societal issues. A growing number of researchers underline how this perspective cannot address the complexity and the dialogical nature of social entrepreneurship. However, while there may be a case for incorporating a political perspective, there is currently no conceptual framework to systematically inform an empirical exploration of the role played by the political vision of entrepreneurs. In this paper, we use the concept of political ideology to offer a solid framework to show how politics can shape social entrepreneurs’ motivations. More precisely we identify three political profiles – anti-statist, reformist and neoliberal – which shape the motives to engage in social entrepreneurship. We take an embedded case study approach of 17 social entrepreneurs involved in a social innovation boot camp and reveal the existence of both, left and right-wing approaches in social entrepreneurship.     

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