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排序方式: 共有1020条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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This paper addresses the optimal design of risk sharing arrangements in reinsurance contracts with asymmetric information concerning the primary insurer’s behavior. The latter usually has significant unobservable discretions, for instance with respect to risk selection, implying a moral hazard problem. We show that the existence of moral hazard strongly affects the characteristics of the reinsurance indemnification rule, i. e. the connection between the level of losses and the indemnity, which is specified in the contract. For this analysis, a standard model framework from the theory of optimal reinsurance with perfect information is modified by the assumption that the primary insurer has unobservable control of the probability distribution of the extent of losses. In particular, the solution indicates that for this situation, a Pareto-optimal indemnity rule is less steep, and therefore the primary insurer’s share in a marginal increase of the loss is greater, compared to the case of complete information. A deductible, however, turns out not to be a suitable approach in this context. 相似文献
3.
An Experimental Bribery Game 总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7
Abbink Klaus; Irlenbusch Bernd; Renner Elke 《Jnl. of Law, Economics, and Organization》2002,18(2):428-454
Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocityrelationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negativewelfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. Weseparate the influences of these factors in an experiment. Ina two-player game, reciprocation is economically inefficientthrough negative externalities. A control treatment withoutexternalities is also conducted. In a third, so-called suddendeath treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusionfrom the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocitycan establish bribery relationships, where negative externalitieshave no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reducescorruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated. 相似文献
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The Leviathan hypothesis remains a cornerstone of constitutional tax theory. Following Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) seminal contribution, the power to tax is often likened to a monopoly, and its use by a revenue-maximising government is said to obey the rules of optimal taxation theory. We revisit, and refine, this position, explaining its underpinnings and discussing the Leviathan solution in several well-known optimal taxation models. It turns out that the power to tax is not a perfect analogue of ordinary monopoly power and that the similarity between Leviathan and optimal taxation solutions hinges on the irrelevance of distributional weights. 相似文献
6.
Faced with a record level of unemployment, the present debate in Germany is to extend the weekly hours of work. In this paper the employment effects of an economy-wide increase in weekly hours are quantified on the basis of a computable general equilibrium model for different specifications of the wage setting rule and the use of additional policy-induced public income. The simulation results back the argument of the opponents of longer working time that not more jobs will be created. However, when the higher tax revenues from GDP growth are used to reduce social security contributions, then the claim of the proponents that more jobs will be created can be supported. 相似文献
7.
Klaus Adam George W. Evans Seppo Honkapohja 《Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control》2006,30(12):2725-2748
Earlier studies of the seigniorage inflation model have found that the high-inflation steady state is not stable under learning. We reconsider this issue and analyze the full set of solutions for the linearized model. Our main focus is on stationary hyperinflationary paths near the high-inflation steady state. These paths are shown to be stable under least-squares learning if agents can utilize contemporaneous data. In an economy with a mixture of agents, some of whom only have access to lagged data, stable hyperinflationary paths emerge only if the proportion of agents with access to contemporaneous data is sufficiently high. 相似文献
8.
The paper examines a model of strategic infrastructure investment. Two oligopolistic firms compete on home and foreign product markets for market shares. The national governments support the firms in the market rivalry by providing cost reducing public infrastructure services that are financed out of taxing an input used in the production process. It is shown, that infrastructure policy can be used as an instrument for strategic trade policy. However, governments are facing the problem of balancing the burden of taxation and the benefits of infrastructures. The theoretical model also raises some critical issues with respect to the policy relevance of recent empirical infrastructure research. 相似文献
9.
Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for “responsive couples markets”, viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation. 相似文献
10.
Carbon Taxes and Joint Implementation. An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis for Germany and India
Christoph Böhringer Klaus Conrad Andreas Löschel 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2003,24(1):49-76
Germany has committed itself toreducing its carbon emissions by 25 percent in2005 as compared to 1990 emission levels. Toachieve this goal, the government has recentlylaunched an environmental tax reform whichentails a continuous increase in energy taxesin conjunction with a revenue-neutral cut innon-wage labor costs. This policy is supposedto yield a double dividend, reducing both, theproblem of global warming and high unemploymentrates. In addition to domestic actions,international treaties on climate protectionallow for the supplementary use of flexibleinstruments to exploit cheaper emissionreduction possibilities elsewhere. One concreteoption for Germany would be to enter jointimplementation (JI) with developing countriessuch as India where Germany pays emissionreduction abroad rather than meeting itsreduction target solely by domestic action. Inthis paper, we investigate whether anenvironmental tax reform cum JI providesemployment and overall efficiency gains ascompared to an environmental tax reformstand-alone. We address this question in theframework of a large-scale general equilibriummodel for Germany and India where Germany mayundertake JI with the Indian electricitysector. Our main finding is that JI offsetslargely the adverse effects of carbon emissionconstraints on the German economy. JIsignificantly lowers the level of carbon taxesand thus reduces the total costs of abatementas well as negative effects on labor demand. Inaddition, JI triggers direct investment demandfor energy efficient power plants produced inGermany. This provides positive employmenteffects and additional income for Germany. ForIndia, joint implementation equips itselectricity industry with scarce capital goodsleading to a more efficient power productionwith lower electricity prices for the economyand substantial welfare gains. 相似文献