Private borrowing during the financial revolution: Hoare's Bank and its customers, 1702–241

The financial revolution improved the British government's ability to borrow, and thus its ability to wage war. North and Weingast argued that it also permitted private parties to borrow more cheaply and widely. We test these inferences with evidence from a London bank. We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the early eighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, the government reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of private clients that could be served profitably.     

Hedging,Financing and Investment Decisions: A Simultaneous Equations Framework

We empirically investigate the interactions among hedging, financing, and investment decisions. We argue that the way in which hedging affects a firm's financing and investing decisions differs for firms with different growth opportunities. We find that high growth firms increase their investment, but not leverage, by hedging. However, we also find that firms with few investment opportunities use derivatives to increase their leverage.     

Models for which the MLE and the conditional MLE coincide

The MLE, CMLE and MMLE coincide in a linear regression model with fixed individual effects. In this case, there is no incidental parameters problem and the MLE is consistent. The equivalence of these estimators is important because CMLE=MLE implies both the consistency of the MLE and the efficiency of the CMLE. In general, we cannot expect to find a CMLE or MMLE, since there may be no fixed-dimension sufficient statistic for the effects, nor an appropriate transformation of the data whose distribution does not depend on the effects. However, we show that the MLE, CMLE and MMLE do coincide in systems of seemingly unrelated regressions and in systems of simultaneous equations. We establish this result for systems in which (exogenous) variables in addition to (or other than) the intercept may have coefficients which vary over individuals, provided that the set of such variables is the same in every equation.The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Through Trial and Error to Collusion*

In this article we study a very simple trial and error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to the joint‐profit‐maximizing outcome.     

A theoretical framework to evaluate different margin‐setting methodologies

The margin system is the first line of defense against the default risk of a clearinghouse. From the perspectives of a clearinghouse, the utmost concern is to have a prudential system to control the default exposure. Once the level of prudentiality is set, the next concern will be the opportunity cost of the investors, because high opportunity cost discourages people from hedging futures, and thus defeats the function of a futures market. In this article, we first develop different measures of prudentiality and opportunity cost. We then formulate a statistical framework to evaluate different margin‐setting methodologies, all of which strike a balance between prudentiality and opportunity cost. Three margin‐setting methodologies, namely, (1) using simple moving averages; (2) using exponentially weighted moving averages; (3) using a GARCH approach, are applied to the Hang Seng Index futures. Keeping the same prudentiality level, it is shown that the one using a GARCH approach by and large gives the lowest average overcharge. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:117–145, 2004     

The index futures markets: Is screen trading more efficient?

This article uses a nonparametric test based on the arc‐sine law (see, e.g., Feller, 1965 ), which involves comparing the theoretical distribution implied by an intraday random walk with the empirical frequency distribution of the daily high/low times, in order to address the question of whether the abandonment of pit trading has been associated with greater market efficiency. If market inefficiencies result from flaws in the market microstructure of pit trading, they ought to have been eliminated by the introduction of screen trading. If, on the other hand, the inefficiencies are a reflection of investor psychology, they are likely to have survived, unaffected by the changeover. We focus here on four cases. Both the FTSE‐100 and CAC‐40 index futures contracts were originally traded by open outcry and have moved over to electronic trading in recent years, so that we are able to compare pricing behavior before and after the changeover. The equivalent contracts in Germany and Korea, on the other hand, have been traded electronically ever since their inception. Our results overwhelmingly reject the random‐walk hypothesis both for open‐outcry and electronic‐trading data sets, suggesting there has been no increase in efficiency as a result of the introduction of screen trading. One possible explanation consistent with our results would be that the index futures market is characterized by intraday overreaction. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:337–357, 2004     

An empirical analysis of the relationship between the hedge ratio and hedging horizon: A simultaneous estimation of the short‐ and long‐run hedge ratios

This article analyzes the effects of the length of hedging horizon on the optimal hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness using 9 different hedging horizons and 25 different commodities. We discuss the concept of short‐ and long‐run hedge ratios and propose a technique to simultaneously estimate them. The empirical results indicate that the short‐run hedge ratios are significantly less than 1 and increase with the length of hedging horizon. We also find that hedging effectiveness increases with the length of hedging horizon. However, the long‐run hedge ratio is found to be close to the naïve hedge ratio of unity. This implies that, if the hedging horizon is long, then the naïve hedge ratio is close to the optimum hedge ratio. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:359–386, 2004     

General‐to‐Specific Model Selection Procedures for Structural Vector Autoregressions*

Structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models have emerged as a dominant research strategy in empirical macroeconomics, but suffer from the large number of parameters employed and the resulting estimation uncertainty associated with their impulse responses. In this paper, we propose general‐to‐specific (Gets) model selection procedures to overcome these limitations. It is shown that single‐equation procedures are generally efficient for the reduction of recursive SVAR models. The small‐sample properties of the proposed reduction procedure (as implemented using PcGets) are evaluated in a realistic Monte Carlo experiment. The impulse responses generated by the selected SVAR are found to be more precise and accurate than those of the unrestricted VAR. The proposed reduction strategy is then applied to the US monetary system considered by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78, pp. 16–34, 1996) . The results are consistent with the Monte Carlo and question the validity of the impulse responses generated by the full system.     

Syndicated Loan Announcements and Borrower Value

Announcements of syndication loans increase borrowers' shareholder wealth if they are revolving credit agreements but not if they are term loans. Share price responses to revolving credit announcements are positive and significant, whereas the wealth effect for term loans is negative and significant. The results show that announcements from both the financial press and commercial information providers can affect borrower share price reaction. Overall, single syndication announcements appear to be more newsworthy than multiple announcements reported in the financial press, and we find evidence of information leakage, post‐announcement drift, or both.