Oligopoly and welfare: A unified presentation with applications to trade and development

We develop a unified sequence of models to examine the determinants of price, output, profitability and concentration for different kinds of oligopolistic market. We relate various magnitudes of significance to judges of welfare and to policy makers, such as consumer surplus, profit, or added benefits of employment or trade surplus, to observable magnitudes such as the size and concentration of the market. It emerges that various appropriately formulated Herfindahl indices are useful in several of these relations. We attempt to present results in a way that is useful for empirical investigations and pay particular attention to applications in trade and development.     

Longevity challenges and leadership interventions: Strategy journeys of two Indian banks

This article studies the strategic journeys of two Indian banks in evolving socio-political and economic environments, spread across eight decades. It provides a holistic view of longevity challenges by exploring interdependencies between a firm’s internal dynamics, external environment, and its leaders. This article covers the growth of Canara Bank and Syndicate Bank in distinct phases of unrestricted, regulated, and centrally planned economic environment, and in changing socio-political scenarios. It uses within-case and across-case analysis, contextualised in these conditions, to provide rich insights about measures adopted by firms for their long-term survival and sustenance.     

Customer-centric pricing: The surprising secret for profitability

Companies spend enormous amounts of energy and capital in creating value for customers, but less regard is given to actually capturing the value they have created. Segmentation based on buying behavior uncovers a tremendous differential in willingness to pay for subjective product attributes such as convenience, status, and quality. Purchase decisions are made through an assessment of a myriad of factors balancing perceptions of value components against price in a subtle, complex, and often sub-conscious decision matrix. Customer-centric pricing requires the simultaneous and continuous assessment of product attributes, customer perceptions, and the circumstances of time and place by listening to customers' actions. It is a means of assuring that companies assess the value they create for customers and extract that value from the marketplace.     

A Repeated Game Model of Monetary Union

Given a policy rule of the common central bank of a monetary union, member countries with different preferences about inflation and facing asymmetric shocks have different incentives to secure political intervention in the bank's operation and achieve the temporary benefit of surprise inflation. This is modelled as a repeated game, and the most cooperative outcome subject to the countries' incentive compatibility constraints is found. The optimal rule responds flexibly to asymmetric shocks, adjusting policy away from the full commitment level toward the discretionary level, so as to maintain the worse-hit country's incentive to abide by the rule.     

Governance Reforms and Growth: Some Ideas from Economic Theory

Ideas from the theory of incentives and organization are deployed to examine how some aspects of economic governance—primarily protection of property rights, enforcement of contracts, and oversight regulation—can be improved for achieving better economic growth and development. Some suggestions for reform of governance institutions in developing countries are offered.     

A taxonomy of information technology-enhanced pricing strategies

As a result of evolving technology, opportunities for innovative pricing strategies continuously emerge. The authors provide an updated taxonomy to show how such emerging strategies relate to recent technological advances. Specifically, they cite increased availability of information, enhanced reach, and expanded interactivity as three technological advancements and identify six pricing strategies enhanced by these factors. They also discuss the role of utility, prospect, range, and signaling theories for emerging pricing strategies, along with several applications and managerial implications.     

On Rybczynski's theorem in a setting of growth

This note re-examines earlier work by Petith on a two-sector economy in steady state growth facing constant world prices. It is shown that a steady state with higher saving propensities out of wages or profits has a higher output of the capital good per head, and greater exports of it compared to the no-trade equilibrium, if and only if the capital good is more capital-intensive. Petith's example yielding counterintuitive results is shown to be in error.     

The impact of group incentives on performance of small firms: Hausman–Taylor estimates

This paper investigates the impact of group incentives on firms' performance. It shows that group incentive raises firms' performance. This result empirically validates the implication of the theoretical literature that performance‐related pay can potentially improve firms' performance, in the context of a developing country, and indicates the importance of group incentives in small firms. It also shows that partnership firms perform better than private limited companies and labour unions have a negative impact on firms' performance. It employs the Hausman–Taylor random effects estimator in order to isolate the effects of time‐invariant covariates and also to tackle potential endogeneity problem. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Some Lessons from Transaction-Cost Politics for Less-Developed Countries

Transaction-cost politics views economic policy-making as a political process constrained by asymmetric information and limited commitment possibilities. This paper examines some implications of this perspective for less-developed countries (LDCs) considering policy reform. It emphasizes that success requires reform of the rules and institutions which govern the strategic interaction of the participants in the political game, and that reforms must cope with the special interests and asymmetric information which already exist. In this light, it examines some broad issues of the design of constitutions and institutions (definition and enforcement of property rights, control of inflation, and of government expenditures, federalism, and redistribution), as well as some specific issue of the design of organizations and incentives (problems posed by the interaction of multiple tasks and multiple interests, and their interaction with the limitations on auditing and administration that exists in many LDCs).