排序方式: 共有3条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
We present a laboratory experiment that measures the effects of group identity—one's perceived membership in social groups—on market transactions in an oligopoly market with a few sellers and buyers. We artificially induce group identity using art preferences and college majors in different treatments, respectively. Subjects are randomly assigned into the roles of buyers and sellers and interact repeatedly. We find that the presence of groups influences both the selection of trading partners and the determination of prices. All else equal, sellers are more likely to make offers to ingroup buyers, and the buyers are more likely to accept offers from ingroup sellers. There are considerable intergroup price differentials with the outgroup sellers charging a lower price than the ingroup sellers. 相似文献
2.
Abstract Agencification has extended and intensified the delegation problem. It has created new (administrative) principals, who are confronted with even more uncertainty as agents operate at arm's length. Trust is suggested as a new mode of governance. Based on the literature seven hypotheses are deduced on conditions that politicians can use to build trust: autonomy; contacts; policy involvement; and involvement in the design of monitoring devices. These hypotheses are tested using survey data on 219 Dutch executive agencies. Contrary to the expectations, executive agencies with low degrees of autonomy have a more trusting relationship with their parent ministry than agencies with high autonomy. Proximity and frequent interactions appear more important to trust than autonomy. Monitoring is not always perceived as a sign of distrust. These findings raise new questions on how principals can reduce the delegation problem and control executive agencies. 相似文献
3.
Price discrimination is generally thought to improve firm profits by allowing firms to extract more consumer surplus. In competition,
however, price discrimination may also be costly to the firm because restrictive incentive compatibility conditions may allow
the competing firm to gain market share at the discriminating firm’s expense. Therefore, with asymmetric competition, it may
be the case that one firm would let the other firm assume the burden of price discrimination. We investigate optimal segmentation
in a market with two asymmetric firms and two heterogeneous consumer segments that differ in the importance of price and product
attributes. In particular, we investigate second-degree price discrimination under competition with explicit incentive compatibility
constraints thus extending prior work in marketing and economics. Focusing on the managerial implications, we explore whether
it would be profitable for either or both firms to pursue a segmentation strategy using rebates as a mechanism. We identify
conditions under which one or both firms would want to pursue such segmentation. We find that segmentation lessens competition
for the less price-sensitive consumer segment and that this results in higher profits to both firms. A key to understanding
this result is that segmentation leads to consumer remixing. We establish the key result that if firms are asymmetric in their
attractiveness to consumers, the disadvantaged firm in our model is more likely to pursue a segmentation strategy than its
rival in equilibrium. We then ask whether this result prevails in practice. To this end, we explore competitive segmentation
empirically and are able to verify that disadvantaged firms indeed pursue segmentation through rebates with greater likelihood. 相似文献
1