首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   28篇
  免费   3篇
财政金融   16篇
工业经济   2篇
计划管理   1篇
经济学   6篇
农业经济   5篇
经济概况   1篇
  2023年   1篇
  2020年   1篇
  2017年   1篇
  2016年   2篇
  2014年   2篇
  2013年   2篇
  2012年   1篇
  2011年   1篇
  2010年   2篇
  2009年   1篇
  2008年   1篇
  2006年   1篇
  2004年   1篇
  1997年   3篇
  1993年   2篇
  1992年   2篇
  1987年   2篇
  1981年   1篇
  1977年   1篇
  1976年   1篇
  1973年   1篇
  1965年   1篇
排序方式: 共有31条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
In this paper the method–production frontier analysis is used to analyse differences in efficiency between different Swedish Employment Offices. Earlier empirical labour market policy evaluation studies have utilised various measures that, however, do not take into consideration differences between organisation units. The main result of this investigation is that employment offices show major differences in the efficiency with which they carry out their job matching services.  相似文献   
2.
This paper estimates the impact of the Chernobyl nuclear accident on domestic and international tourism in Sweden. From ARIMA time series forecasts, outlier search, and intervention analysis based on regional monthly accommodation data from 1978–1989, no effect on domestic tourism is found. However, there is an enduring deterrence effect on incoming tourism. The loss of gross revenue from incoming tourism because of the Chernobyl accident, is estimated to 2.5 billion SEK.  相似文献   
3.
A group of players in a cooperative game are partners (e.g., as in the form of a union or a joint ownership) if the prospects for cooperation are restricted such that cooperation with players outside the partnership requires the accept of all the partners. The formation of such partnerships through binding agreements may change the game implying that players could have incentives to manipulate a game by forming or dissolving partnerships. The present paper seeks to explore the existence of allocation rules that are immune to this type of manipulation. An allocation rule that distributes the worth of the grand coalition among players is called partnership formation‐proof if it ensures that it is never jointly profitable for any group of players to form a partnership and partnership dissolution‐proof if no group can ever profit from dissolving a partnership. The paper provides results on the existence of such allocation rules for general classes of games as well as more specific results concerning well‐known allocation rules.  相似文献   
4.
5.
6.
We study how a concern for robustness modifies a policymaker's incentive to experiment. A policymaker has a prior over two submodels of inflation‐unemployment dynamics. One submodel implies an exploitable trade‐off, the other does not. Bayes' law gives the policymaker an incentive to experiment. The policymaker fears that both submodels and his prior probability distribution over them are misspecified. We compute decision rules that are robust to misspecifications of each submodel and of the prior distribution over submodels. We compare robust rules to ones that Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent (2007) computed assuming that the models and the prior distribution are correctly specified. We explain how the policymaker's desires to protect against misspecifications of the submodels, on the one hand, and misspecifications of the prior over them, on the other, have different effects on the decision rule.  相似文献   
7.
8.
The monetary policy mandate for the Federal Reserve and of the Riksbank are essentially the same and boil down to stabilizing inflation around the inflation target and employment or unemployment around a long‐run sustainable rate. The relative weight on stabilizing unemployment or employment versus stabilizing inflation may be close to one. A positive unemployment‐gap forecast normally calls for a positive inflation‐gap forecast.  相似文献   
9.
We show how to construct optimal policy projections in Ramses, the Riksbank’s open‐economy medium‐sized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for forecasting and policy analysis. Bayesian estimation of the parameters of the model indicates that they are relatively invariant to alternative policy assumptions and supports our view that the model parameters may be regarded as unaffected by the monetary policy specification. We discuss how monetary policy, and in particular the choice of output gap measure, affects the transmission of shocks. Finally, we use the model to assess the recent Great Recession in the world economy and how its impact on the economic development in Sweden depends on the conduct of monetary policy. This provides an illustration on how Rames incoporates large international spillover effects.  相似文献   
10.
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号