Multiple aspect testing for case-control designs

When testing for the equality of two distributions in a case-control design with treatment effects presumed to act possibly on more than one aspect, different tests may be properly considered for testing for different features of a null hypothesis, leading to the multiple aspect testing issue. Two different aspects are therefore of interest: the location-aspect, based on the comparison of location indexes, and the distributional-aspect, based on the comparison of the empirical distribution functions. A simulation study shows that the combined testing procedure exhibits a good robust overall performance, and an application in biomedical research is also presented.     

Introduction to Political Science

This introduction to the JET symposium on political science briefly reviews the main results of the papers in this issue and tries to put them in the context of the current research in political theory. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D71, D72, D78.     

Minimizing Regret: The General Case

In repeated games with differential information on one side, the labelling “general case” refers to games in which the action of the informed player is not known to the uninformed, who can only observe a signal which is the random outcome of his and his opponent's action. Here we consider the problem of minimizing regret (in the sense first formulated by J. Hannan (1956, in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. III, Annals of Mathematics Studies, Vol. 39, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.) when the information available is of this type. We give a simple condition describing the approachable set. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D81, D82, D83.     

A theory of stopping time games with applications to product innovations and asset sales

Summary In this paper, the pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of a general class of stopping time games are studied. It is shown that there always exists a natural class of Markov Perfect Equilibria, called stopping equilibria. Such equilibria can be computed as a solution of a single agent stopping time problem, rather than of a fixed point problem. A complete characterization of stopping equilibria is presented. Conditions are given under which the outcomes of such equilibria span the set of all possible outcomes from perfect equilibria. Two economic applications of the theory, product innovations and the timing of asset sales, are discussed.Parts of this paper were presented at seminars at Chicago, Rochester and Rutgers and we acknowledge helpful comments. We are also indebted to a referee for his detailed and thoughtful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Bankers, Industrialists, and their Cliques: Elite Networks in Mexico and Brazil during Early Industrialization

The historiographies of Mexico and Brazil have implicitly statedthat business networks were crucial for the initial industrializationof these two countries. Recently, differing visions on the importanceof business networks have arisen. In the case of Mexico, theliterature argues that entrepreneurs relied heavily on an informalinstitutional structure to obtain necessary resources and information.In contrast, the recent historiography of Brazil suggests thatafter 1890 the network of corporate relations became less importantfor entrepreneurs trying to obtain capital and concessions,once the institutions promoted financial markets and easy entryfor new businesses. Did entrepreneurs in Brazil and Mexico organizetheir networks differently to deal with the different institutionalsettings? We examine whether in Mexico businessmen relied moreon networks of interlocking boards of directors and other informalarrangements to do business than in Brazil. Our hypothesis isconfirmed by three related results: (1) the total number ofconnections (i.e., the density of the network) was higher inMexico than Brazil; (2) in Mexico, there was one dense corenetwork, while in Brazil we find fairly dispersed clusters ofcorporate board interlocks; and most importantly, (3) politiciansplayed a more important role in the Mexican network of corporatedirectors than their counterparts in Brazil. Interestingly,even though Brazil and Mexico relied on very different institutionalstructures, both countries had similar rates of growth between1890 and 1913. However, the dense and exclusive Mexican networkmight have ended up increasing the social and political tensionsthat led to the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920).     

Tracing VARDI coefficients: a proposal

ABSTRACT

We propose a new approach for tracing the so-called ‘value-added-(re)distribution-important coefficients’ (in short the VARDI coefficients) in a world input–output model. From the perspective of a selected group of economies, VARDI coefficients may be defined as those elements in world input–output matrix in the case of which a small change in their levels leads to the maximization of a share of this group of economies in value added in global value chains. Due to the rapid development of the World Input Output Database, this approach may be easily applied in empirical research to different groups of countries and sectors in world IO models. In an illustrative empirical case study, we use the new approach in order to answer a question regarding what the main directions of the future macroeconomic policy of the U.S. could be in order to ensure the maximization of the country’s share in global value added.     

Is job control always beneficial? Exploring its nonlinearity in creativity and in-role performance

This study draws on resource allocation theory to examine the relationship between job control and two kinds of job performance, namely employee creativity and in-role performance, as well as to investigate whether supervisor encouragement of creativity moderates these two potentially nonlinear relationships. To test the proposed model, we collected data from 234 employees in Indonesia. The results show that job control has an inverted U-shaped relationship with employee creativity, but a U-shaped relationship with in-role performance. Supervisor encouragement of creativity moderates both relationships, such that the control–creativity relationship becomes U-shaped, while the control–in-role performance relationship becomes inverted U-shaped when supervisor encouragement of creativity is high. Implications for managers on how to provide resources to employees are discussed.     

Understanding the size and profitability of firms: The role of a biological factor

In a large sample of entrepreneurs, 2D:4D (second-to-fourth digit) ratio and managerial performance are studied. Entrepreneurs with lower ratio manage larger firms, manage larger firms when acquire control and experience faster average growth. Firms run by high prenatal testosterone entrepreneurs have lower profitability as measured by return on assets and return on sales. Prenatal testosterone is correlated with elicited measures of entrepreneurial skills, like work effort and optimism and the latter are correlated with firm size. This evidence suggests entrepreneurial ability has a biological component and is consistent with models of the size distribution of firms based on entrepreneurial ability.     

Self-selection and variations in the laboratory measurement of other-regarding preferences across subject pools: evidence from one college student and two adult samples

We measure the other-regarding behavior in samples from three related populations in the upper Midwest of the United States: college students, non-student adults from the community surrounding the college, and adult trainee truckers in a residential training program. The use of typical experimental economics recruitment procedures made the first two groups substantially self-selected. Because the context reduced the opportunity cost of participating dramatically, 91 % of the adult trainees solicited participated, leaving little scope for self-selection in this sample. We find no differences in the elicited other-regarding preferences between the self-selected adults and the adult trainees, suggesting that selection is unlikely to bias inferences about the prevalence of other-regarding preferences among non-student adult subjects. Our data also reject the more specific hypothesis that approval-seeking subjects are the ones most likely to select into experiments. Finally, we observe a large difference between self-selected college students and self-selected adults: the students appear considerably less pro-social.