Technical innovation and 3.5 mobile phone generation: Lessons from Korea

In 1996, the Korean mobile communication market was the first in the world to commercialize the code division multiple access (CDMA). Since then, the voice-based mobile phone market has continued to grow and has now reached near saturation. Having recognized the potential of the mobile data service as a new source of profit, telecommunication operators are scrambling to evolve 3.5 generation (3.5G) technology in order to lead market competition. Recently, the Korean 3.5G mobile telecom market has faced stiff competition from CDMA-based EVDO Rev.A and global system for mobile telecommunications (GSM)-based high-speed downlink packet access (HSDPA). In addition, the world's first wireless LAN-based wireless broadband internet (WiBro) service was commercialized in June, 2006. This paper reviews the current status of the 3.5G technology and analyzes the service standardization strategies from the viewpoint of technological evolutions. This paper also suggests implications for Korea's specific circumstances where different mobile telecom technologies complement and compete with one another. Korea's experiences may serve as important lessons for other countries or operators who try to introduce the 3G and look beyond mobile telecom technologies.     

Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing

This paper addresses two very old issues in human society: espionage and double crossing. Our major conclusion points out that there will be a serious over rewarding problem in the direct mechanism due to double crossing in espionage, and a competitive mechanism with a relative performance regime can possibly mitigate the over rewarding problem and still extract the information.      

著名经济学家季崇威对外开放思想述评——纪念季崇威先生逝世两周年

在人生旅途上,有长者始终如一的关怀和指导,是幸运的,这可以让我们少走弯路,进步成长更快.我无疑是幸运的.我国对外开放理论的先驱、德高望重的季崇威先生,也是我非常敬重的长者,引领我在对外开放理论研究中走过十多年的岁月,耳濡目染,季老的学术思想、高尚品格令我终生受益.     

Intelligent Order Matching Systems for Commodity Markets

Automatic order matching systems have emerged as an electronic alternative to traditional markets. In current automatic order matching systems, price and quantity are the only product dimensions used for the order matching. However, a single-commodity market is made up of many heterogeneous goods which are close to each other but different in qualities and delivery conditions. Price and quantity are important but represent only parts of product attributes that commodity traders want to take into account. This study aims to extend current automatic order matching systems by diversifying product dimensions. An intelligent order matching system not only maximizes the total transaction volume based on the price and quantity but also satisfies traders' qualitative preferences over attributes other than price and quantity. The intelligent order matching mechanism combines an economic model with a preference model to incorporate both quantitative and qualitative utility of market participants. Constraint logic programming is investigated as a new information technology to structure and implement the intelligent order matching system.     

An Integrative Framework for Measuring the Extent to which Organizational Variables Influence the Success of Process Improvement Programmes

abstract    Studies on the three types of process improvement programmes (Continuous Improvement, Reengineering and Benchmarking) have appeared many times in the literature. These studies suggest that certain organizational variables act as enablers and their presence or absence can significantly influence success rates. Such studies have tended to examine companies where a single programme has been implemented. In contrast, this paper examines a sample of companies who have experienced all three programmes. Our aim is to compare and contrast each programme's impact on firm performance and identify which organizational variables are common and which are programme-specific enablers of success. We build and test an integrative framework to support our analysis. Our study found that: (1) Reengineering delivered the greatest impact on performance; (2) executive commitment was needed to make this happen; (3) strategic alignment was the major influence on the success rate of Reengineering and Continuous Improvement programmes; and (4) employee empowerment was necessary for each programme to work effectively.     

A duration analysis of privatization in the telecom sector

The paper attempts to identify the telecom-sector performance indicators, relevant economic variables, and institutional characteristics of a country that effect the process of privatization of state-owned telecom enterprises. Using standard duration analysis of a panel data, we demonstrate that the privatization incentives are not only shaped by the mobility of financial capital in a country but are also influenced by the degree of competitiveness of private sector participation in policy-making process. The empirical results also reveal the significant impact of productive efficiency in telecom service provision on its course to privatization. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. We are solely responsible for all mistakes.     

Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War

This study extends the great fish war model of Levhari and Mirman [Levhari, D. and Mirman, L. (1980) Bell Journal of Economics 11: 322–344] by incorporating a multiple country context into the model and investigates the existence of a partial coordination Nash equilibrium. First, findings of this paper suggest that a partial coordination scheme is sustainable only in limited cases. Any coalition that has more than two member countries cannot be sustained. Second, the existence and the number of coordinating countries depend critically on the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters. Finally, if the coalition is assumed to be a dominant player, there always exist one or two welfare-improving sustainable coalitions and the size of the sustainable coalitions depends on the parameters of the problem.     

Entry deterrence and innovation in durable-goods monopoly

This paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable-goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well. We show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good. The equilibrium is therefore determined not only by the incentive for intertemporal price discrimination in durable-goods monopoly, but also by the incumbent's concern for maintaining the technological leadership. We demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation.