Endogenous direct advertising and price competition

This paper analyzes how the use of endogenous direct advertising affects the functioning of a horizontally-differentiated market. We formulate a two-stage game of pricing and informative advertising in which two firms, first, compete with mass advertising and, later, build a database using their historical sales records and compete by directly targeting the ads on their potential customers. We show that, compared to the case where firms only use mass advertising, direct advertising yields higher advertising efforts and an intertemporal reallocation of both market power and profits from the first to the second period. We also find that targeting increases the overall firms’ profit and the level of social welfare, but the impact on the average intertemporal price and consumer surplus is ambiguous. Finally, when reaching the potential market with mass advertising is sufficiently expensive, the use of direct advertising leads firms to provide the socially optimal level of advertising whereas, if mass advertising is cheap, firms tend to launch too little advertising in the first period and too much in the second.     

In love with the debit card but still married to cash

Using shopping diary survey data, we show that changing payment patterns is a challenging task; even when consumers have fallen in love with a new payment instrument, they find it hard to divorce from their old payment instrument. We find a discrepancy between how consumers prefer to pay and how they actually pay. Half of the consumers who prefer the debit card to cash don’t use the debit card to pay a majority of their point-of-sale transactions. Our regression results show that the habit of paying cash plays a significant role explaining the presence of a gap.     

Small but Sincere: How Firm Size and Gratitude Determine the Effectiveness of Cause Marketing Campaigns

Cause-Marketing (CM) has gained momentum in recent years, both in marketing research and practice. However, while CM aims to influence consumers on an emotional or affective level, research into the emotional and affective response to CM campaigns is scarce. The current research fills this void by showing that a CM campaign is a win–win–win strategy. Though the tangible benefits of CM campaigns go to the firm and the philanthropic cause, our perspective is novel by arguing that the consumer benefits as well, albeit intangibly; CM campaigns provide an opportunity to do good, and hence induce feelings of gratitude in consumers. However, this effect depends on several contingencies. In particular, consumers perceive greater effort by small firms, relative to large firms, that engage in CM campaigns, leading them to assess the underlying motives as more sincere and then experience stronger feelings of gratitude for the opportunity to donate. Four experiments confirm this greater CM effectiveness for small compared with large firms. In turn, this study offers substantive contributions for both marketing research and practice: It proposes a cost-effective strategy for enhancing CM effectiveness, and specifies concrete strategies for both small and large companies.     

Customer Directed Advertising and Product Quality

This paper studies the relationship between three key elements of the marketing mix, namely, price, product, and promotion, in a model where a seller employs informative advertising to launch a new product. We propose a fairly general advertising technology for the study of three promotional strategies—mass, imperfectly targeted, and customer directed advertising (CDA). We find that both the private and the social incentives to use distinct advertising strategies are aligned, and that sales are likely to be promoted through CDA. Compared to mass advertising, with CDA the social planner reduces quantity and downgrades quality whereas the seller sometimes upgrades it. Our model of targeting with endogenous product quality provides some new insights into the way the transition from mass to specialized advertising can affect market outcomes. Quality distortions imply that (i) even if CDA increases the market price, the degree of market power need not increase and (ii) CDA may yield a welfare loss even if it leads to a lower market price.     

Pricing with Endogenous Direct Advertising in a Monopoly

This paper develops a model of informative advertising in which a firm builds a database using its historical sales records in order to directly target ads on those consumers who have a high probability of purchasing its products. We show that the firm can use this type of direct advertising as a screening mechanism to identify high demand consumers. As a result, direct advertising can work essentially as a device to increase a firm's monopoly power. From a social point of view, this implies that the transition from traditional mass-advertising to direct advertising can generate a trade-off between higher advertising efficiency and greater monopoly power. We compute the model to shed light on the relative strength of these two forces, and find that while direct advertising might have a substantial negative impact on consumers, this advertising technology can only occasionally reduce welfare.     

Informative Advertising and Optimal Targeting in a Monopoly

This paper analyzes how the transition from mass to specialized advertising can affect the market outcomes. To that end, we consider a particular technology of information transmission which allows a monopolist to decide the optimal targeting strategy. From this starting point, we show that the use of targeted advertising is likely to increase the market price and reduce the level of advertising, and that the degree of media specialization chosen by the monopolist tends to exceed the socially optimal. Furthermore, our model indicates that the social loss resulting from the greater monopoly power might exceed the gain due to the lower wasting of ads, in such a way that targeting could reduce consumer surplus and, what is more important, the level of social welfare.     

Perfect versus imperfect direct advertising,and market performance

We present a model of economic growth driven by horizontal innovation in which, unlike the existing literature, the final output sector employs a non-specified, non-CES, additive production function. Our motivation in conducting such analysis is based on the recognition that the use of a CES aggregate production function in the final output sector leads to the unrealistic conclusion that the gross markup of price over marginal costs set in the monopolistically-competitive intermediate sector is constant. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium with perfect competition in the final output market to exist even in the presence of a non-CES technology. These conditions generalize the usual properties of the CES case. We also analyze the long-run relation between economic growth and variable markups.     

Advertising Media Planning,Optimal Pricing,and Welfare

This paper analyzes optimal media planning strategies in a pricing‐advertising competition model where firms can use mass and specialized advertising. We find that although targeted advertising avoids the wasting of ads, firms might find it optimal to mix specialized advertising with the mass media. We also show that the characteristics of the specialized media available crucially affect the outcome of price competition between firms, which can range from a full fragmentation of the market into local monopolies to lower average prices (compared to the case where firms had only mass advertising available). Regarding welfare, we prove that although the use of specialized advertising can lower consumer surplus and drive a fragment of consumers out of the market, this advertising technology is welfare‐improving, and can be Pareto superior.