The monopolist's optimal R&D portfolio

The monopolist's incentives towards product and process innovationsare evaluated against the social optimum. The main findingsare that (i) the incentive to invest in cost-reducing R&Dis inversely related to the number of varieties being suppliedat equilibrium, under both regimes; (ii) distortions obtainunder monopoly, w.r.t. both the number of varieties and thetechnology. With substitutes, the monopolist's product rangeis smaller than under social planning, while with complementsthe product range is the same under both regimes. For any givennumber of goods, the monopolist operates at a higher marginalcost than the planner does.     

A model of growth with inherited tastes

This research aims at studying a general equilibrium closed economy with overlapping generations and inherited tastes (aspirations), as in de la Croix (Econ Lett 53(1):89–96, 1996). It shows that the interaction between the intensity of aspirations and the elasticity of substitution of effective consumption affects the qualitative and quantitative long-term dynamics from both local and global perspectives. The related literature is extended by showing that (1) the Neimark–Sacker bifurcation found by de la Croix (1996) does not necessarily give rise to fluctuations and (2) endogenous (long-lasting) fluctuations occur through the emergence of period-doubling bifurcations.     

The role of human capital in identifying the drivers of product and process innovation: empirical investigation from Italy

Quality & Quantity - Economists recognize that the local availability of higher human capital represents significant knowledge spillovers, especially for innovation process. This research...     

Job protection legislation and productivity growth in OECD countries

We examine the effect of dismissal regulation on productivity in the OECD, using annual cross-country aggregate data on the stringency of employment protection legislation and industry-level data on productivity from 1982 to 2003. Our empirical results suggest that mandatory dismissal regulations have a depressing impact on productivity growth in industries where layoff restrictions are more likely to be binding. By contrast, we find no evidence of a productivity effect of regulations concerning temporary contracts, which suggests that partial reforms, facilitating the use of fixed-term and atypical contracts, are unlikely to have an important impact on efficiency and technological change and cannot therefore be a substitute for comprehensive reforms whereby dismissal restrictions for open-ended contracts are also weakened.
--- Andrea Bassanini, Luca Nunziata and Danielle Venn