Collective Risk Control and Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion

We provide an analysis of odds‐improving self‐protection for when it yields collective benefits to groups, such as alliances of nations, for whom risks of loss are public bads and prevention of loss is a public good. Our analysis of common risk reduction shows how diminishing returns in risk improvement can be folded into income effects. These income effects then imply that whether protection is inferior or normal depends on the risk aversion characteristics of underlying utility functions, and on the interaction between these, the level of risk, and marginal effectiveness of risk abatement. We demonstrate how public good inferiority is highly likely when the good is “group risk reduction.” In fact, we discover a natural or endogenous limit on the size of a group and of the amount of risk controlling outlay it will provide under Nash behavior. We call this limit an “Inferior Goods Barrier” to voluntary risk reduction. For the paradigm case of declining risk aversion, increases in group size(wealth) will cause provision of more safety to change from a normal to an inferior good thereby creating such a barrier.     

Monotonizing empirical Bayes estimators for a class of of discrete distributions with monotone likelihood ratio

A procedure is given for the construction of a monotone estimator that dominates a given estimator for a class of discrete distributions with monotone likelihood ratio. This procedure is applied to some empirical Bayes estimators. Monte Carlo results are given that demonstrate the usefulness of monotonizing.     

Extraction of an Exhaustible Resource: The Effects on Investment of Several Parameters Being Subject to Uncertainty*

This article shows that the effect on investment of the introduction of uncertainty about the size of one parameter depends on what other parameters are simultaneously uncertain. Further, two parameters may be linked with positive or negative covariances. The covariances are here shown to have important effects on the investor, whether risk neutral or risk averse. Governments are advked to consider policies that affect the covariances of those parameters that are key influences on in vestment.     

STABILIZATION POLICY, LEARNING-BY-DOING, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This paper shows that fiscal policy, when used for stabilizationpurposes, can have a positive effect on the economy's growth,on human capital accumulation, and on welfare. We introducestochastic productivity shocks into a model in which productivityis augmented through learning-by-doing If future benefits oflearning-by-doing are not fully internalized by workers, thenrecessions are periods in which opportunities for acquiringexperience are foregone. We identify configurations of disturbancesand other parameters for which a countercyclical policy maximizesgrowth and welfare.     

INVESTMENT IN FIXED CAPITAL AND COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY DYNAMICS

This paper explores the possibilities for complex dynamic behaviourin an industry where a fixed capital good, once acquired andinstalled, is specific to that industry. A central theme isto understand the sorts of factors which can impose bounds onthe behaviour of market price and which can impart stabilityto the system. The analysis highlights the significance notonly of the durability and specificity of physical capital goodsbut also of capacity (under-) utilisation decisions and of thecautiousness of producers when expanding their capacities.     

LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY AND EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT: MICRO EVIDENCE FROM UK ESTABLISHMENTS

In this paper we study how firms react to demand shocks, examininghow different aspects of flexibility shape their responses.Our main findings are: (i) very few firms choose to adjust pricein response to a demand shock; (ii) firms with more flexibilityare more likely to respond to demand shocks by adjusting employmentand hours. Our results provide a microeconomic explanation forrecent macroeconomic evidence that labour input has become moreclosely aligned to the business cycle.     

Masculinity,Testosterone, and Financial Misreporting

We examine the relation between a measure of male CEOs’ facial masculinity and financial misreporting. Facial masculinity is associated with a complex of masculine behaviors (including aggression, egocentrism, riskseeking, and maintenance of social status) in males. One possible mechanism for this relation is that the hormone testosterone influences both behavior and the development of the face shape. We document a positive association between CEO facial masculinity and various misreporting proxies in a broad sample of S&P1500 firms during 1996–2010. We complement this evidence by documenting that a CEO's facial masculinity predicts his firm's likelihood of being subject to an SEC enforcement action. We also show that an executive's facial masculinity is associated with the likelihood of the SEC naming him as a perpetrator. We find that facial masculinity is not a measure of overconfidence. Finally, we demonstrate that facial masculinity also predicts the incidence of insider trading and option backdating.     

On Targeting Frameworks And Optimal Monetary Policy

We show that speed limit policy, a monetary policy strategy that focuses on stabilizing inflation and the change in the output gap, consistently outperforms flexible inflation targeting and flexible price level targeting in empirical medium‐scale DSGE models under discretionary policymaking. In contrast to small‐scale New Keynesian models, this welfare ranking of the targeting frameworks is not overturned when inflation dynamics are mostly backward‐looking. Importantly, the performance of the speed limit policy shows less sensitivity to its parameterization than other frameworks that target the inflation rate or the price level.     

The Market for Conflicted Advice

We present a model of the market for advice in which advisers have conflicts of interest and compete for heterogeneous customers through information provision. The competitive equilibrium features information dispersion and partial disclosure. Although conflicted fees lead to distorted information, they are irrelevant for customers' welfare: banning conflicted fees improves only the information quality, not customers' welfare. Instead, financial literacy education for the least informed customers can improve all customers' welfare because of a spillover effect. Furthermore, customers who trade through advisers realize lower average returns, which rationalizes empirical findings.