Retailing from the margins - the re-emergence of a food co-operative movement?

The disadvantage faced by low-income food consumers has long been recognized, with such groups likely to pay more for their food products, which are commonly limited in terms of range and quality. Such disadvantage stems not only from economic constraints, but also from geographical, sociodemographic and infrastructural factors, such as low car ownership levels (which limit mobility), age, family structure and infirmity. Issues of access and mobility are especially pertinent given that the majority of U.K. food retailers have sought to achieve increased market share through the pursuit of economies of scale, the inherent benefit of high margin maintenance, large format development and the relocation to edge-of-town/out-of-town and affluent suburban sites. To date, little attention in the form of research has been directed to examining strategies adopted by those on low incomes to address such circumstances. This paper outlines the initial findings of a wider longitudinal study that examines the activities of food co-operatives and food groups within the Glasgow area, which are run by, and are for the benefit of, those on low incomes. Through semi-structured interviews with relevant local government departments and funding bodies, management committees and volunteers involved in the daily operation of food groups, the initial aim was to identify the operational and organizational characteristics of food cooperative initiatives. The next stage was to determine what those involved perceived as the contribution made to the members and wider community, and finally, future opportunities for food cooperatives were identified. The results therefore, provide an invaluable insight, not only into the workings of food co-operatives, but also into the experience of those on low incomes in respect of food shopping. The research findings, perhaps ironically, provide a possible strategic direction for food retailers who, in the face of traditional market saturation, must identify new market growth opportunities within areas that they have previously neglected.     

More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets

This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1987) model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency, and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium exists uniquely and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others. Sometimes intermediation is essential: the market operates if and only if middlemen are active. If bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient; if not there can be too much or too little economic activity. This is novel, compared to the original Rubinstein–Wolinsky model, where equilibrium is always efficient.     

Changes in Segment Reporting in the Australian Banking Industry

This paper examines changes in segment reporting in the Australian banking industry following the introduction of the revised AASB 1005 Segment Reporting. We find that the standard has implications for the qualitative characteristics of "understandability" and "comparability". Feedback on the revised standard is timely, as both the AASB and the IASB have recently issued new segmental reporting standards that are based on US GAAP's management approach of determining operating segments.     

The Effectiveness of Alternative Risk Assessment and Program Planning Tools in a Fraud Setting*

This study examines the impact of alternative risk assessment (standard risk checklist versus no checklist) and program development (standard program versus no program) tools on two facets of fraud planning effectiveness: (1) the quality of audit procedures relative to a benchmark validated by a panel of experts, and (2) the propensity to consult fraud experts. A between‐subjects experiment, using an SEC enforcement fraud case, was conducted to examine these relationships. Sixty‐nine auditors made risk assessments and designed an audit program. We found that auditors who used a standard risk checklist, structured by SAS No. 82 risk categories, made lower risk assessments than those without a checklist. This suggests that the use of the checklist was associated with a less effective diagnosis of the fraud. We also found that auditors with a standard audit program designed a relatively less effective fraud program than those without this tool but were not more willing to seek consultation with fraud experts. This suggests that standard programs may impair auditors' ability to respond to fraud risk. Finally, our results show that fraud risk assessment (FRASK) was not associated with the planning of more effective fraud procedures but was directly associated with the desire to consult with fraud specialists. This suggests that one benefit of improved FRASK is its relation with consultation. Overall, the findings call into question the effectiveness of standard audit tools in a fraud setting and highlight the need for a more strategic reasoning approach in an elevated risk situation.