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1.
Efficient bidding with externalities 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Ins Macho-Stadler David Prez-Castrillo David Wettstein 《Games and Economic Behavior》2006,57(2):304-320
We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals. 相似文献
2.
In a situation in which people who are required to fill in a tax-return coexist with tax-return-exempt people, we prove that
the optimal audit policy leads to different tax compliance behavior, depending on the difficulty of detecting an evader who
does not fill in a tax return, passing himself of as a non-taxpayer. 相似文献
3.
Albert Banal-Estañol Inés Macho-Stadler 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2010,19(1):185-221
This paper proposes a framework to analyze the effects of scientific and commercial incentives in R&D organizations. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable of obtaining innovative ideas. Although they reduce the time spent on research, we show that commercialization incentives also affect the choice of research projects. Commercial rewards induce a more intensive search for (ex post) path-breaking innovations, which are more likely to be generated through (ex ante) riskier research programs. We derive the organization's optimal incentive scheme in terms of the researcher's characteristics. We show that organizations should use a high level of commercial incentives for scientists who have strong or weak intrinsic preferences for research. For those with strong preferences, the organization needs to induce development, whereas for those with weak ones, it needs to induce effort. 相似文献
4.
Inés Macho-Stadler & J. David Pérez-Castrillo 《The Journal of industrial economics》1998,46(4):489-510
We study the optimal allocation of the contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment. Centralizing is superior when the principal is able to establish all the contracts with the agents simultaneously and she is able to monitor side contracting between the agents. Otherwise, decentralizing can be a superior strategy. We apply our results to a firm's decision on which outlets to franchise. They suggest that franchising is more likely to occur the further the store is from headquarters, the more isolated it is and in those activities where the risk is low. This conclusion is consistent with empirical studies. 相似文献
5.
Competition for Managers and Product Market Efficiency 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
We investigate whether competition between two firms to hire managers with different abilities might affect efficiency in the product market, when a manager's effort is his/her private information. We conclude that competition for managers might lead to an improvement in efficiency in the market of the firm that attracts the most efficient manager. Competition for managers might even eliminate the productive efficiency loss due to the asymmetry of information in the firm-manager relationship. 相似文献
6.
Universities and research institutions have the responsibility to produce science and to provide training to new generations of researchers. In this paper, we propose a model to analyze the determinants of a senior scientist’s decisions about allocating time between these tasks. The results of this decision depend upon the characteristics of the research project, the senior scientist’s concern for training and the expected innate ability of the junior scientist involved. We analyze the role that a regulator can play in defining both the value of scientific projects and the future population of independent scientists. 相似文献
7.
Inés Macho-Stadler Pau Olivella & David Pérez-Castrillo 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》1999,1(4):439-463
We present a dynamic model of tax evasion, where tax liabilities last for two periods and the probability of an inspection decreases with the sum of taxes evaded this period plus taxes evaded last period. We show that a tax amnesty that pardons more than the evasion penalties (an extensive amnesty) can temporarily improve compliance. Whenever the inspection technology improves, steady state compliance also improves, but the economy takes time to transit from one steady state to the other. We show that an amnesty may accelerate this transit, or even make it instantaneous if the amnesty is extensive enough. 相似文献
8.
9.
In this note, we study the behavior of firms competing in a Cournot duopoly framework where owners and managers are separate identities and where cross-participation at the ownership level exists. We find that depending on the degree of cross ownership, managerial incentives may be more or less towards profit maximizing behavior. Moreover we show that limited cross-participation may be a way for owners to obtain collusive behavior without apparently offending Anti-Trust laws.We would like to thank M. P. Espinosa, C. Matutes, J. D. Pérez Castrillo, J. Ricart, V. Salas, X. Vives, and an anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions. I. Macho-Stadler's research was partially supported by the project PGV 9022.1. The usual disclaimers apply. 相似文献
10.
Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities when forming the grand coalition is efficient. We show that any sharing rule satisfying efficiency, linearity, dummy player and a strong symmetry axioms can be obtained through an average game. Adding an additional axiom, we identify one unique rule satisfying these properties. 相似文献