Migration,Ethnicity and Solidarity: ‘Multinational Workers’ in the Former Soviet Union

We investigate migrant construction workers’ experiences in the Former Soviet Union, examining their attitudes to other ethno-national groups, unions and collective action. Industrial relations and migration studies view migrant workers’ hypermobility and diversity, under conditions of low union coverage and rising nationalism, as potentially obstructing consciousness-raising and mobilizing. Workers in our study faced union indifference, ethno-national segregation and discrimination. However, managerial abuses, informality and contestation from below led to spontaneous mobilization. Lack of institutional channels to solve these disputes drove workers’ further mobility. Complex mobility trajectories and collective action translated into increased awareness of collective interests and rejection of nationalist ideologies. The outcome is ‘multinational workers’ potentially resistant to nation-state politics and capital's logics but also aware of the value and usefulness of collective solidarities. Thus, previous arguments solely associating exit with individualistic attitudes, and post-socialist legacies with workers’ quiescence present only partial pictures.     

Optimal Emissions Taxation under Imperfect Competition in a Durable Good Industry

This paper investigates optimal emissions taxation under imperfect competition in a durable good industry where products are sold (instead of rented). As a benchmark, attention is paid to the special case of monopoly with exogenously given product durability. In line with previous literature, the optimal emission tax in this benchmark model falls short of marginal damage (underinternalization). Extending the benchmark model either to the case of an oligopolistic market structure and/or to the case of endogenous product durability then provides two cases in which the optimal emission tax overinternalizes marginal damage.     

Competition, Contractibility, and the Market for Donors to Nonprofits

This article investigates theoretically and empirically theeffects of competition for donors on the behavior of nonprofitorganizations. Theoretically, we consider a situation in whichnonprofit organizations use donations to produce some commodity,but the use of donations is only partially contractible. Themain results of the model indicate that an increase in competition(i) decreases the fraction of donations allocated to perquisiteconsumption and (ii) increases the fraction of donations allocatedto promotional expenditures. Moreover, the effects of competitionare magnified by the ability to contract on the use of donations.These hypotheses are tested with data on the expenditures ofnonprofit organizations in a number of subsectors where competitionis primarily local. We use across–metropolitan statisticalareas' variation to measure differences in competition and proxycontractibility by the importance of tangible assets, whichare more easily observed by donors. The estimated effects ofcompetition and contractibility are consistent with our model.     

FIRM HETEROGENEITY,IMITATION, AND THE INCENTIVES FOR COST REDUCING R&D EFFORT*

I develop and test a model of strategic R&D investments where innovating and non‐innovating firms compete on the basis of their ability to reduce costs and imitate rivals. I find that a larger proportion of non‐innovating rivals stimulates cost‐reducing investments and attenuates the disincentive effect of imitation by innovators on firm level R&D. Key model properties are verified by estimating the first order condition for the optimal choice of R&D, using the 1994 Carnegie Mellon survey of U.S. industrial R&D. Results also suggest that R&D and size are simultaneously determined, with R&D being proportional to size, as predicted by the theoretical model.     

Evaluation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models based on distributional comparison of simulated and historical data

We take as a starting point the existence of a joint distribution implied by different dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, all of which are potentially misspecified. Our objective is to compare “true” joint distributions with ones generated by given DSGEs. This is accomplished via comparison of the empirical joint distributions (or confidence intervals) of historical and simulated time series. The tool draws on recent advances in the theory of the bootstrap, Kolmogorov type testing, and other work on the evaluation of DSGEs, aimed at comparing the second order properties of historical and simulated time series. We begin by fixing a given model as the “benchmark” model, against which all “alternative” models are to be compared. We then test whether at least one of the alternative models provides a more “accurate” approximation to the true cumulative distribution than does the benchmark model, where accuracy is measured in terms of distributional square error. Bootstrap critical values are discussed, and an illustrative example is given, in which it is shown that alternative versions of a standard DSGE model in which calibrated parameters are allowed to vary slightly perform equally well. On the other hand, there are stark differences between models when the shocks driving the models are assigned non-plausible variances and/or distributional assumptions.     

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Financial instability and the real economy

Summary The paper deals with three different areas of the financial sphere: national moneys, exchange rates and financial claims, markets and institutions. For each of them, it tries to identify the main forms of instability which may occur, their causes and consequences for the real economy. Depending on the area concerned, the forms of instability include inflation, fluctuations and misalignments in interest rates, exchange rates and asset prices and finally solvency and liquidity crises of institutions. It is concluded that, over the last fifteen years, significant progress has been made in the policy framework to counteract instabilities in the national and monetary spheres. The conclusion is more mixed with regard to the structure of financial markets.[/p]We are grateful to Julian Alworth, Svein Andresen, Gavin Bingham, Joe Bisignano, Michael Hutchison and Paul van den Bergh for useful comments.     

Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids

We introduce bids in a rent-seeking contest. Players compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying efforts, they also submit a bid which is payable only if they win the prize. We show that our model has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which each active player submits the same bid, while the sum of all efforts equals that bid. In equilibrium there is underdissipation of rent.     

Does Gibrat's Law hold among young,small firms?

According to Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Effect, the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning of the examined period. Aimed at extending this line of investigation, the present paper uses quantile regression techniques to test whether Gibrat's Law holds for new entrants in a given industry: that is for new small firms in the early stage of their life cycle. The main finding is that for some selected industries in Italian manufacturing Gibrat's Law fails to hold in the years immediately following start-up, when smaller firms have to rush in order to achieve a size large enough to enhance their likelihood of survival. Conversely, in subsequent years the patterns of growth of new smaller firms do not differ significantly from those of larger entrants, and the Law therefore cannot be rejected.JEL Classification: L11, L60Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 27th Annual EARIE Conference (Lausanne, 7-10 September 2000) and at seminars held between 2000 and 2003 at the Economics Department of Harvard University, the Catholic University of Milan, the University of Ferrara, the University of Bologna, the Bank of Italy, and Athens University of Economics & Business. We would like to thank Carlo Bianchi, Giuseppe Colangelo, Giovanni Dosi, Steven Klepper (Editor), Stephen Martin, Ariel Pakes, Aman Ullah and, in particular, Helen Louri and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from MIUR (Year 2000; protocol #MM13038538_001; project leader: E. Santarelli) is gratefully acknowledged.Correspondence to: E. Santarelly     

Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision and Regulation?

Over the last decade or so, addressing financial instabilityhas risen to the top of the policy agenda. This essay arguesthat in order to improve the safeguards against financial instability,it may be desirable to strengthen further the macroprudentialorientation of current prudential frameworks, a process thatis already under way. The essay defines, compares and contraststhe macro- and microprudential dimensions that inevitably coexistin financial regulatory and supervisory arrangements, examinesthe nature of financial instability against this backgroundand draws conclusions about the broad outline of desirable policyefforts.(JEL G2) "Words, like nature, half reveal and half conceal the soul within" Alfred Lord Tennyson "When I use a word... it just means what I choose it to mean– neither more, nor less" Humpty Dumpty