Selfishness versus public ‘regardingness’ in voting behavior

The selfishness hypothesis in voting behavior is formalized and tested. For the first time individual net benefits from a bond proposal, computed using the median voter model, are used to explain voting behavior. It was found that taxpayers in general voted according to their self- interest as defined by net benefits. However, high income groups voted in favor of proposals that would have redistributed income to the poor. Their behavior is consistent with either the public ‘regardingness’ hypothesis or with an extension of the selfishness hypothesis which includes real estate speculation.     

The tradeoff between growth and equity in decentralization policy: China's experience

This paper investigates the potential tradeoff between economic growth and regional equity in the design of fiscal decentralization policy in the context of China's experience. We develop a theoretical model of fiscal decentralization, where overall national economic growth and equity in the regional distribution of fiscal resources are the two objectives pursued by the central government. The model is tested using panel data for 1985–98. We find that fiscal decentralization in China has led to economic growth as well as to significant increases in regional inequality.     

A general equilibrium model of Value Added Tax evasion: an application to Pakistan

International Economics and Economic Policy - Value Added Taxes (VAT) constitute a major share of tax revenues in developing countries in which tax evasion is widespread. The literature on VAT...     

Country performance during the Covid-19 pandemic: externalities,coordination, and the role of institutions

Economics of Governance - The Covid-19 pandemic is one of the most powerful examples of negative externalities in local communities, entire countries and across the globe, calling for the...     

Tax morale affects tax compliance: Evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment

Our working hypothesis is that cross-cultural differences in tax compliance behavior have foundations in the institutions of tax administration and citizen assessment of the quality of governance. Tax compliance being a complex behavioral issue, its investigation requires use of a variety of methods and data sources. Results from artefactual field experiments conducted in countries with substantially different political histories and records of governance quality demonstrate that observed differences in tax compliance levels persist over alternative levels of enforcement. The experimental results are shown to be robust by replicating them for the same countries using survey response measures of tax compliance.     

Are benevolent dictators altruistic in groups? A within-subject design

We use a within-subject experimental design to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct features of individual preferences: altruism in a two-person context, risk aversion in monetary outcomes, and social preferences in a group context. We find that altruism is related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-interest in a group tax redistribution game which we interpret to be an expression of social preferences.