Socio-demographics,political attitudes and informal sector employment: A cross-country analysis

In this paper, we empirically investigate the relationship between informal sector employment and micro-level socio-demographic characteristics, political acts and attitudes, and individual norms. Using self-reported individual micro-level data from the World Values Survey for seven developing countries (China, Ecuador, Egypt, Mexico, Peru, South Africa and Yemen), our cross-country regressions and principal component analysis reveal that socio-demographic characteristics of individuals are strong predictors of their informal sector employment. Our estimations further document that individual preferences for an economically strong, interventionist and egalitarian state and confidence in state and political institutions are positively and significantly correlated with informal sector employment, whereas variables associated with confidence in free market institutions and support for competition are negatively and significantly correlated with informal sector employment. We also show that individuals who participate either actively or inactively in peaceful and lawful political processes are significantly less likely to work in the informal sector. Finally, we document that individual norms, such as religiosity and tax morale, are negatively correlated with informal sector employment. Throughout our analysis, instead of having to rely on ad-hoc informality categorizations of third parties, we base our measurement of informal sector employment directly on the self-evaluation of individuals, who have the best information on the degree of their informality.     

“问题富豪”如何凸现中国银行业信贷管理缺陷？

福布斯在中国内地的出名，更多是因其著名的“富豪榜”，但最近的内地富豪中有几位却遇到了不小的“麻烦”。今年在上海举办的《福布斯》论坛中诸多议题之一的中国银行业也备受关注，而这几位遇到不小“麻烦”的富豪给中国的银行业起到了什么警惕作用呢？“问题富豪”反映出中国银行业信贷管理缺陷有哪些？就此，国务院发展研究中心经济研究副所长巴曙松博士特撰此稿。     

Accumulation and distribution of human capital: the interaction between individual and aggregate variables

The paper analyses the joint evolution of accumulation and distribution of human capital in an OLG framework. Dynamics arises from the interplay between human capital distribution and individual variables—inherited human capital and inborn ability. Such interaction drives individual investment in human capital and accumulation in the economy. According to initial distribution the model provides different dynamical behaviours linking growth and inequality; in general economies with a more equal initial distribution grow faster but other cases are possible. Moreover, since the model provides an endogenous threshold for investing in human capital, the distribution is characterised by multi-modality.     

Financial Innovation and Information: The Role of Derivatives When a Market for Information Exists

We study the effects of financial innovation in a model of endogenousinformation acquisition. We determine the conditions under whichthe introduction of a derivative written on an existing stockincreases or decreases the incentive to purchase information.We show that financial innovation produces some effects whichhold across informational structures and others which differ.The former coincide with the few empirical results that arerobust in the literature (effects on prices, risk premia, andvolatility), while the latter coincide with the ones that differexperiment by experiment (effects on volume, correlation betweenvolume and volatility, and market informational efficiency).     

Evaluation of cooperative research

This report looks at evaluation studies of a number of cooperative academic-industrfy research programmes in Europe, and suggests that indirect economic benefits should be taken into account as well as motives and goals of participating firms.     

基于战略意图的战略联盟绩效评价指标体系研究

目前理论界对于企业战略联盟绩效评价的研究,大多数都是使用单纯的财务绩效指标对联盟的绩效进行评价。本文提出,联盟的绩效评价首先应当从组成联盟的企业的各自角度出发。其次由于不同的战略联盟的战略意图相差迥异,应当从战略联盟建立的战略意图出发,来设计评价战略联盟绩效的指标体系。首先对战略联盟各种战略意图作了一个系统的分析,然后提出一套基于战略意图的联盟绩效的评价指标体系,并给出了一种定量评价方法。     

Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining

The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.     

On pricing lookback options under the CEV process

Abstract We consider the problem of pricing European lookback options when the underlying asset price is driven by a constant elasticity of variance (CEV) process. The evaluation model is based on the binomial approximation developed by Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990) and we show how to apply it in the case of such options. We develop simple pricing algorithms that compute accurate estimates of the option prices.     

Concentration and public policies in the broadcasting industry: the future of television

New technologies are deeply transforming the broadcasting industry. What we have seen so far is only the beginning of a long story. Inevitably, industry regulations must adapt, which means that a wide-ranging rethink of current practices is required. In order to assess the likely evolution of the industry, this article decomposes it into a number of components, from conception of programmes to their broadcasting, including distribution, storage and licensing. Contrary to popular expectations, the analysis suggests that the current high degree of concentration will, if anything, increase. The policy implication is that regulation, so far driven by now obsolete technological constraints, should increasingly emphasize promoting competition.