Who are these people? Personality traits and judgments about trade secret misappropriation in post‐employment activities

Trade secret theft is a problem that almost all organizations face. The greatest threat is employee mobility and potential unethical post‐employment behavior. This study investigates the role of individual personality traits in judgments about trade secret misappropriation. Our hypotheses were tested in three studies addressing three different situational contexts: current employees, employees about to be laid off, and students who had quit their job. Relationships were estimated with robust regression. The results show that some personality traits predict judgment about another person's trade secret misappropriation, and that the situational context in which individuals formulate their ethical judgment moderates the impact of personality traits on ethical judgment.     

Application de la théorie collective du risque à la réassurance « Excess-Loss »

Abstract

Introduction.

Les méthodes de calcul de la prime de réassurance Excess-Loss utilisées jusqu'à présent ou bien avaient un caractère purement empirique, ou bien présumaient que les écarts entre le montant des sinistres constatés et le montant des sinistres attendus se répartissent suivant la loi de Laplace-Gauss.     

The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy

This paper is organized as follows: first, we show that the reference to the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek’s thought. Second, we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek’s theses in this domain. Finally, we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek’s approach and propose means to solve them.

Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability

In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear–quadratic setup we show that the endogenization of voting weights (given by portfolio holdings) can give rise to – through self-fulfilling expectations – dramatical political instability, i.e. Condorcet cycles of length two even for very high majority rules.     

THEORY AND EVIDENCE IN PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS ABOUT MOTIVATION CROWDING OUT: A POSSIBLE CONVERGENCE?

The empirical relevance of motivation crowding out is a controversial issue in economics and psychology. As already pointed out by Frey and Jegen ( 2001 ), this is partly due to the historical development of two distinct and parallel strands of literature that stem from different theoretical traditions, have radically different tenets and therefore, are difficult to reconcile. In this survey, we go back to the details of the debates that took place independently among psychologists and economists, and sketch an integrative interdisciplinary approach likely to favor a more fruitful collaboration between economics and psychology. From this perspective, experimental economics (both field and laboratory) is viewed as a major research field shedding new light on the conditions of relevance of motivation crowding out.