Competition in the electricity industry in England and Wales

When the electricity industry was privatized, the governmentmade structural changes to encourage competition in generationand in supply to consumers. The conventional power stationswere only divided between two companies, however, and we showthat duopolistic competition in an unregulated spot market mightimply undesirably high prices. Most sales are hedged in thecontract market, which makes the spot market more competitive,and a realistic threat of entry could also force generatorsto keep their prices down. In the event, a large amount of entrytook place, supported by the regional electricity companies'franchise monopoly over smaller consumers. That monopoly endsin 1998, so that further entry might become very difficult,while competition between firms already in the generation marketis still limited. Vertical integration between the major generatorsand regional electricity companies might make entry even harder,and should be blocked until the industry is more competitive.     

CHARGING FOR ROADS

The article discusses two theoretical methods of measuring roaduse costs and designing a system of road user charges. The firststates that road damage externalities are zero and road damagecosts are equal to the traffic-related fraction of maintenanceexpenditure. The second states that, with constant returns andoptimal road capacity, congestion charges should recover theremaining total overhead costs. Vehicles should be charged thesecosts, and additional pure taxes on passenger vehicles shouldbe guided by principles of indirect taxation. Although roaduser charges alone may fail to cover the total highway budget,the additional pure taxation is likely to more than cover theshortfall. The article argues that an appropriate system oftaxes and charges can be devised to meet these requirementswithout adversely effecting the rest of the economy.      

Supply function equilibria: Step functions and continuous representations

In most electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers to a uniform price auction. These markets are often modelled as simpler pure-strategy Supply Function Equilibria (SFE) with continuous supply functions. Critics argue that the discreteness and discontinuity of the required steps drastically change Nash equilibria, invalidating predictions of the SFE model. We prove that there are sufficient conditions, offered quantities can be continuously varied, offered prices are selected from a finite set, and the density of the additive demand shock is not too steep, where the resulting stepped SFE converges to the continuous SFE as the number of steps increases, reconciling the apparently very disparate approaches to modelling electricity markets.     

Analytical Screens for Electricity Mergers

Electricity mergers pose distinct challenges for competition policy. Electricity demand is highly inelastic in the short run, storage is limited, and transmission constraints limit the ability to substitute generation at other locations. As a result, a merger can affect prices in many different markets and even generators with small market shares may be able to exercise market power. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s approach for screening horizontal mergers, based on the concentration thresholds in the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, can fail to identify mergers that lessen competition, and mergers that fail the FERC screen may have no significant anticompetitive effect. We propose competitive residual demand (CRD) analysis, which examines the supply curves of the markets affected by a merger and considers the ability and incentive of firms to raise prices before and after a proposed merger. CRD analysis is a relatively easy way to address the incentives for generators to exercise market power and relies on data that are often available. Vertical (convergent) mergers between electricity and gas raise additional concerns, and we propose a methodology to screen vertical mergers.     

Redistributive impact of indirect tax reforms: Greece, 1988–2002

This paper assesses the distributional impact of indirect taxes among Greek households between 1988 and 2002, a period that coincides with the introduction of significant reforms in the tax system due to EU membership. The highly differentiated indirect tax structure prevailing at the beginning of the period had distributional benefits over the more simplified 2002 tax structure. The overall inequality of the after‐tax welfare distribution has increased by 6–12½ per cent and changes in the indirect tax system seem to explain about half of this increase. The paper also applies a recent method of measuring the distributional impact of relative price changes caused by changes in tax rates of commodities (Newbery, 1995) and establishes that indirect tax reforms introduced since 1988 had an adverse impact on the distribution of purchasing power, which nevertheless seems to be very small.     

The Evolution of the Tax Structure of a Reforming Transitional Economy: Hungary 1988–98

The paper analyses the revenue-raising, distributional and incentive effects of the personal tax system in Hungary from the start of the transitional tax reforms of 1988 to 1998, and shows that the tax structure has converged to an almost linear form similar to the more heavily taxed EU countries. The 1998 pension reform has reversed a trend increase in average and marginal tax rates but marginal rates still appear too high for a country wishing to encourage growth and employment creation.