A new take on voice: the influence of BlackRock’s ‘Dear CEO’ letters

Review of Accounting Studies - Abstract We examine whether broad-based public engagement by institutional investors influences the behavior of portfolio firms. We investigate this question in the...     

The Effect of Accounting Restatements on Earnings Revisions and the Estimated Cost of Capital

This paper examines the effect of accounting restatements on a firm's cost of equity capital. We show that, on average, accounting restatements lead to both decreases in expected future earnings and increases in the firm's cost of equity capital. Depending on the model used, relative percentage increases in the cost of equity capital average between 7 and 19% in the month immediately following a restatement. The relative increase in the cost of capital dissipates as time passes and after controlling for analyst forecast biases, but continues to average between 6 and 15% in the most conservative setting. We also show that restatements initiated by auditors are associated with the largest increase in the cost of capital, and that firms with greater leverage experience greater increases in their cost of capital. Overall, our evidence is consistent with accounting restatements lowering the perceived earnings quality of the firm and increasing investors' required rates of return.     

Optimales Vertragsdesign bei moralischem Risiko in der Rückversicherung

This paper addresses the optimal design of risk sharing arrangements in reinsurance contracts with asymmetric information concerning the primary insurer’s behavior. The latter usually has significant unobservable discretions, for instance with respect to risk selection, implying a moral hazard problem. We show that the existence of moral hazard strongly affects the characteristics of the reinsurance indemnification rule, i. e. the connection between the level of losses and the indemnity, which is specified in the contract. For this analysis, a standard model framework from the theory of optimal reinsurance with perfect information is modified by the assumption that the primary insurer has unobservable control of the probability distribution of the extent of losses. In particular, the solution indicates that for this situation, a Pareto-optimal indemnity rule is less steep, and therefore the primary insurer’s share in a marginal increase of the loss is greater, compared to the case of complete information. A deductible, however, turns out not to be a suitable approach in this context.     

Delaying integration of immigrant labor for the purpose of taxation

Delayed integration (DI) is a rule for taxing migrants. It requires that immigrants be taxed in the host country only after some period of transition. Conversely, emigrants are released from the obligation to pay taxes only after a certain period. DI is an alternative to the Employment Principle and the Home-Country Principle. The former governs the international taxation of labor. The latter is a close substitute for the Nationality Principle, on which US tax law is based. The paper studies DI in a setting which allows one to trade off the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation and of wasteful government.     

Außenhandelsstruktur und Faktorintensität 1962/1977

Summary As a supplement to the findings presented in an article in volume 2/1978 of this journal byG. Fink andJ. Skolka some further results concerning the capital and labour intensity of Austria's trade are provided. These results are based on a more disaggregated input-output approach and on modified ways to measure direct capital and labour inputs and seem to strenghten the hypothesis that in 1964 the capital and labour intensity of Austria's foreign trade was more or less neutral.The same approach was used to investigate the effects of the changing composition of export and import bundles on the factor intensities for the period 1962/1977. Although the structure of both exports and imports changed remarkable over this period the total content of labour and capital remained rather stable and the evolution was almost paralell for exports and imports.     

Concave utility on finite sets

When does a preference relation on a finite set have a concave or a strictly concave utility function? We provide a complete answer. Our proof is an application of the Theorem of the Alternative, and constructs a concave utility if one exists.     

The effects on investment incentives of an allowance for corporate equity tax system: the Belgian case as an example

The Modigliani–Miller theorem serves as the standard finance paradigm on corporate capital structure and managerial decision making. Implicitly, it is assumed that the market possesses full information about the firm. However, if firm managers have insider information, they may attempt to ‘signal’ changes in the firm’s financial structure and, in competitive equilibrium, shareholders will draw deductions from such signals. Empirical work shows that the value of underlying firms rises with leverage because investors expect such firms to implement positive NPV projects. We empirically examine this view using a sample of debt issue announcements by publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We argue that the timing of debt issues is fundamental in determining the relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted returns. We show that an announcing firm’s intrinsic value may not rise depending on when management publicly ‘signals’ changes in their firm’s capital structure. Specifically, we show that risk-adjusted returns rise positively for firms that make debt announcements during normal economic conditions while they tend to decline for firms making debt announcements during recessionary periods. During recessionary periods, market risk and loss aversion rise and investors focus less on the potential growth of debt announcing firms and focus more on potential losses instead. We conclude that the timing of new debt is of paramount importance and managers’ inability to prudently time such announcements can lead to exacerbated levels of systematic risk coupled with a significant erosion in shareholder wealth.     

Improving the effectiveness of nondisclosure agreements by strengthening concept learning

Intellectual property infringements rank among the top economic crimes, even though there are mechanisms in place to prevent their occurrence. One such mechanism are nondisclosure agreements, which, however, have been reported to fail in practice. This article argues that this may be overcome by strengthening employees’ concept learning. In an experiment, we investigated whether extended nondisclosure agreements, which provide the employee with detailed explanations and examples, lead to better recognition of trade secrets as compared to a standard nondisclosure agreement or no agreement at all. It was found that the extended nondisclosure agreement indeed increased participants’ ability to judge what falls under the trade secret law, whereas the standard nondisclosure agreement showed no such effect. Furthermore, the effects of the factors ‘Involvement’, ‘Specificity’, ‘Publicity’, and ‘Purpose’ on the identification of trade secrets could be proven experimentally. Employees’ judgments of whether an information represents a trade secret seem to rely on general cognitive processes. From this follows that concept learning could be integrated into systematic approaches for protecting intellectual property.