On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Applying a non parametric methodology to the study of corporate reputation

This study applies nonparametric methodologies to the study of corporate reputation. The study examines the reputation of the five leading Israeli banks in the aftermath of a major crisis in the industry, and compares it with the reputation of the five major insurance firms in the country across seven reputation attributes which are then correlated with “hard” measures, including corporate performance. While promotional investment was identified as the major reputation determinant in both industries, performance and size were found to be major codeterminants in the banks, while age and growth were the major co-determinants among the insurance firms. A negative relationship has been identified between performance and prestige.     

Public choice interpretations of distributional preference

This essay examines, from the perspective of both economics and ethics, the logical foundations of income transfers in a democratic society that allocates resources, in the large, through free markets. Such transfers, enacted through the public choice process, modify the market-determined distribution of income, as a reflection of the distributional preferences of the members of a society. Both constitutional and post-constitutional explanations of redistributions are considered. A discussion of recent experimental evidence of distributional preferences leads into a critique of simple equality, built on Michael Walzer's distinction between monopoly and dominance, as a criterion of distributive justice.     

Are college education and job experience complements or substitutes? Evidence from hedge fund portfolio performance

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine, for various educational characteristics of hedge fund managers, the performance profile of hedge fund portfolios along their...     

Sequential facility location with distance dependent demand

Systems providing identical service to many population centers frequently face the issue of where to locate the next retail outlet, branch, store, etc. In such systems the demand for the facilities' service depends mainly on the distance between facilities and customers. It is assumed that there are already m facilities located on a network to respond to the demand at the nodes. The paper addresses the problems of finding a location on the network for the (m +1 )st facility corresponding to a given total expected demand and of determining which demand points will be served by which facility. Also the range of the total expected demand values that can be realized along each link in the m +1 facility system is determined. Examples and a discussion of the results are provided.     

From Physical to Human Capital Accumulation: Inequality and the Process of Development

This paper develops a growth theory that captures the replacement of physical capital accumulation by human capital accumulation as a prime engine of growth along the process of development. It argues that the positive impact of inequality on the growth process was reversed in this process. In early stages of the Industrial Revolution, when physical capital accumulation was the prime source of growth, inequality stimulated development by channelling resources towards individuals with a higher propensity to save. As human capital emerged as a growth engine, equality alleviated adverse effects of credit constraints on human capital accumulation, stimulating the growth process.     

Migrants' Savings, Purchasing Power Parity, and the Optimal Duration of Migration

If some of the returns to migration accrue from returnmigration, the optimal duration of migration may be shorter thanthe feasible duration of migration. We develop a model that providesand highlights conditions under which return migration takesplace even though a reversal of the inter-country wage differentialdoes not occur. In particular, we consider the higher purchasingpower of savings (generated from work abroad) at home than abroadas a motive for return migration. Inter alia, our model producesa negative relationship between the optimal duration of migrationand the purchasing power differential and in some (but not all)cases, a negative relationship between the optimal duration ofmigration and the wage abroad. In addition, and contrary to ourprior anticipation, our utility maximization analysis suggeststhat East-West migration will tend to be temporary while inter-EuropeanCommunity (or intra-West European) migration will likely be permanent.     

Concepts of extended preference

This paper remedies ambiguity in the discussion of interdependent preferences by developing a consistent set of distinctions, which span the full range of sympathetic and antipathetic interaction, for the two-person case without reactive behavior. It defines concepts such as benevolence, generosity, altruism, destructiveness, and willingness to begrrudge transfers to others and indicates how their use can clarify the discussion of economic behavior. The definitions take account of preferences (indicated by rates of substitution) and prices (indicated by rates of exchange) at critical income allocations.     

The brain drain, ‘educated unemployment’, human capital formation,and economic betterment1

Extending both the ‘harmful brain drain’ literature and the ‘beneficial brain gain’ literature, this paper analyzes both the negative and the positive impact of migration by skilled individuals in a unified framework. The paper extends the received literature on the ‘harmful brain drain’ by showing that in the short run, international migration can result in ‘educated unemployment’ and overeducation in developing countries, as well as a brain drain from these countries. A simulation suggests that the costs of ‘educated unemployment’ and overeducation can amount to significant losses for the individuals concerned, who may constitute a substantial proportion of the educated individuals. Adopting a dynamic framework, it is then shown that due to the positive externality effect of the prevailing, economy‐wide endowment of human capital on the formation of human capital, a relaxation in migration policy in both the current period and the preceding period can facilitate ‘take‐off’ of a developing country in the current period. Thus, it is suggested that while the migration of some educated individuals may reduce the social welfare of those who stay behind in the short run, it improves it in the long run.     

From political praise to stock options: Reforming compensation systems in the people's republic of China

The recent reforms in the People's Republic of China have brought into focus the system of compensation in Chinese enterprises. This paper examines the evolution of compensation schemes in China, with a special emphasis on the reforms of recent years, the obstacles they face, and the prospects for the future.