The Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle: Why the Swiss Do Not Want to Tax the Rich

In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to impose a tax on the super rich in a popular vote and thereby fund a redistributive policy. However, a large majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’     

Inflation Risk?

Intereconomics - Inflation is on the rise again in the industrialised world. This has led to fears of a sustained surge in inflation. This article argues that while such fears may make sense in the...     

Intra-Household Resource Allocation, Consumer Preferences and Commodity Tax Reforms: Australian Evidence

Empirical analysis of household expenditure behaviour has traditionally ignored the issue of resource allocation between household members, assuming that they have identical or unitary preferences. This paper relaxes that assumption, develops a household sharing rule and proposes intra-household demand systems that are able to identify differences in the preferences of members from conventional data. The resulting price and expenditure elasticities are used to demonstrate that collective demand models suggest different directions for commodity tax reforms to those implied by the traditional unitary model.     

Predicting Household Poverty: A Methodological Note with a Kenyan Example

Household surveys provide data that is used for identifying and measuring the poverty status of households and individuals. However, carrying out such surveys is expensive, especially in poor developing countries. Thus it is important to make maximum use of the available survey data in developing countries, especially in sub‐Saharan Africa, where such data are expensive to collect and analyse. This paper develops a simple method for using poverty indices derived from survey data for a given year, to predict poverty rates for subsequent periods without having to conduct a new household survey. We illustrate the workings of the method with data from Kenyan household surveys for 1994 and 1997.     

Intertemporal Substitution and Terms-of-Trade Shocks

The paper examines the relationship between transitory terms‐of‐trade shocks and private saving. Using a model allowing for nonseparability between the consumption of tradables and nontradables, the paper estimates the intertemporal elasticity of substitution while accounting for the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the consumption of tradables and nontradables. Empirical analysis of data for five industrial countries indicates that in response to transitory terms‐of‐trade shocks, intertemporal substitution of consumption and intratemporal substitution of consumption between tradables and nontradables both have large effects on private saving.     

Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.      

Import Protection Bias

Rodrik (1995) notes that trade regimes tend to be biased towards import protection, while the standard political economy models either yield no prediction on the bias of the trade regime or predict, counterfactually, a bias towards the export sector. This constitutes an important shortcoming in the political economy of trade literature. In this paper, the Grossman and Helpman (1994 ) “Protection for Sale” model is extended by adding government expenditure. This expenditure may be financed via a combination of tariff revenue and a distorting wage tax. In addition to the government expenditure, export subsidies need to be financed either via tariff revenue or a distorting wage tax. With this addition, plausible values of the model's parameters yield import protection bias.     

Corporate self-greenewal: Strategic responses to environmentalism

The rise of environmentalism in the past decade has become a major transforming force in pollutive and hazard prone industries. Corporate environmental responsiveness is not simply a peripheral and one of the many ‘social’ or ‘ethical’ issues facing business. It is becoming a central concern for competitiveness, productivity, and profitability. It is creating strategic transformation of companies in a diverse range of industries such as, Autos, Chemicals, Oil, Fast Foods, Power Generation, Pharmaceuticals, etc. The process of environmentally directed self-renewal, called ‘greenewal’ here, affects all aspects of companies. It implies changes in products, production systems, waste management practices and internal systems. It seeks to make companies simultaneously more competitive and environmentally responsible. This paper describes the pressures of and responses to environmentalism in a selected set of industries. It examines the processes of greenewal that companies are undergoing. It identifies implications for strategic greening of firms.