The fragility of a discipline when a model has monopoly status

We consider the consequences of a scientific literature with only one model of an important phenomenon. The falsification of the model would mean falsification of the science. Scientists who would prefer not to have their discipline falsified will be tempted to find ad hoc explanations to excuse the failure. To test this hypothesis we propose a study of the economic forecasts of the comparative Soviet and American growth rates in the years before a public choice model of central planning was a viable alternative to the public interest model. JEL Code A11, B23 Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the University of Manitoba Economics Department Retreat in October 2005 and at the Center for Study of Public Choice Wednesday Seminar in November 2005. We thank the participants for their suggestions. All the remaining errors are our responsibility.     

Larry Moss and the Struggle Against Racism by the Whately Professors of Political Economy

In this note, we highlight an important consideration of Larry Moss's life's work, the continual struggle within economics against racism. Larry initiated and supported the symposium on eugenics published by the American Journal of Economics and Sociology in July 2005. He edited the volume Social Inequality, Analytical Egalitarianism and the March Toward Eugenic Explanations in the Social Sciences in August 2008. These constitute obvious signs of Larry's concern.
He conjectured that the Trinity College Dublin political economists who held the Whately professorship should be thought of as a school. Such a school was in fact identified in 1850 by an outsider who pointed to their shared opposition to racial explanations within an institutional setting. That shared opposition allowed them to speak against the narrow interests of the rulers of the country. Of course, other political economists of the time, Mill in particular, were also emphatic in their anti-racism. Thus, not only do we need to take up Larry's challenge to describe the Trinity College school but we must also seek its connections with the Scottish-English group of anti-racists.     

Irrationality and intertemporal choice in early neoclassical thought

Early neoclassical economists presumed an element of irrationality in the context of intertemporal decision making. W.S. Jevons, Irving Fisher, Alfred Marshall, and A.C. Pigou observed a preference for present over future consumption, and each took this as evidence that consumer 'foresight' or 'will power' was defective. The labouring classes were said to discount future consumption to reflect uncertainty, and such discounting is regarded as 'rational.' But each of these economists focused on an additional, and purportedly 'irrational,' reason for discounting: 'impatience.' Consumers are thus said to make persistent miscalculations when it comes to decisions involving time.
Irrationalité et choix intertemporel dans les débuts de la pensée néo-classique. Les premiers économistes néo-classiques présumaient qu'il y avait un brin d'irrationalité dans le processus de décision intertemporel. W.S. Jevons, Irving Fisher, Alfred Marshall et A.C. Pigou ont observé une certaine préférence de la consommation présente par rapport à la consommation future et en ont déduit que le consommateur manquait de 'prévoyance' et de 'volonté.' On suggérait que les classes travailleuses escomptaient leur consommation future à cause de l'incertitude - ce qui était considé comme rationnel. Mais chacun de ces économistes faisait aussi appel à une raison additionnelle pour escompter la consommation future - l'impatience - un motif jugé irrationnel. On en concluait que les consommateurs faisaient des erreurs persistantes de calcul quand ils prenaient des décisions intertemporelles.     

A discipline without sympathy: the happiness of the majority and its demise

Abstract.  Experimental economists frequently invoke Adam Smith's notion of sympathy, and experimental treatments typically examine sympathy in situations where two groups are involved. We explore additional implications of sympathy suggested by the work of later classical economists. We link the notion of sympathy to their majoritarian welfare analysis. Since sympathy provides a source of moral obligation, classical economists held that agents in democratic politics will refrain from unjust acts. We also consider how sympathetic agents may effect reforms that involve more than two parties, in which the benefits from the action accrue to someone who is not part of the 'exchange.' JEL classification: B12, D63     

From Cardinal to Ordinal Utility Theory

A bstract .   This paper examines the transition from cardinal to ordinal utility. We begin with the egalitarian utilitarianism of J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer, in which everyone was supposed to count as one. That is their phrase to explain how the happiness of existing people was to be maximized. We compare Spencer's goal with Darwin's goal of the "general good," in which the number of perfect people was to be maximized. Spencer's goal was egalitarian, while Darwin's entailed biological perfection or hierarchy. We consider Edgeworth's hedonic calculus, in which the notion of hierarchy enters economics. For Edgeworth, agents have differential capacities for happiness. Throughout, we consider normative aspects of Darwin's work, in particular Darwin's challenge to the early utilitarianism of Mill and Spencer. We suggest that the Paretian principle returns utilitarianism to its egalitarian roots.     

After Hayek: On Theodore Burczak’s socialism after Hayek

Burczak reformulates socialism to escape Hayek’s strictures against central planning. While Hayek supports a social safety net as well as other liberal reforms, Burczak points out that these reforms fall outside Hayek’s theoretical framework. We explain that this is because Hayek narrowed the classical economists’ conception of sympathetic agency to imitation and rule following. By contrast, liberal reform proposals follow from the theoretical framework of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. For Smith and Mill, sympathy is a richer concept in which people change places imaginatively with others. Sympathetic agency allows a wide range of other regarding actions and political reforms.