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Derek J. Clark Jean Christophe Pereau 《Journal of economic behavior & organization》2009,72(1):546-553
We consider production by a firm that relies on the patent rights that are held by other actors. Before production can take place, bargains have to be struck with each patent holder over the royalty per unit produced. In the negotiations, a patent holder must be mindful of the fact that a large royalty will increase the product price and lower demand for the final product. Hence each patent holder would prefer to gain a large royalty at the expense of rivals. When the producer makes the first offer in an alternating offer framework, we analyze whether it should conduct negotiations sequentially with some grouping of patent holders or simultaneously. We demonstrate that the producer will prefer simultaneous negotiation. An individual patent holder would prefer to negotiate early with the producer, and then to see remaining rights holders negotiate simultaneously. A firm that holds several patents would want to negotiate royalties on each one sequentially and then have simultaneous negotiation of payments to other rights holders. 相似文献
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Review of Economic Design - We consider a vertical supply chain in which a monopoly retailer produces a good by assembling a number of essential components each of which is owned by a monopoly.... 相似文献
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Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper focuses on the link between group co-operation and unilateral commitment of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. We show that in case of a failure of negotiation, some countries can decide to commit unilaterally and reduce their emissions. We call this behaviour precautionary commitment. Absence of international agreement does not mean global defection from the environmental issue.We also show that the emergence of a non-co-ordinatedglobal co-operation can result from a strategic actionfrom the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordinating their emissions. 相似文献
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This paper analyses the impact of the disinflation policy timing on the sign and the magnitude of the sacrifice ratio in a modified price and wage staggered model of Blanchard (1986). When wages are updated every four quarters and prices every two quarters, we show that a “cold-turkey” disinflation is associated to an output boom when the policy is implemented during the last period of life of the wage contract and a recession in the other quarters. 相似文献
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Jean-Christophe Pereau Lauriane Mouysset Luc Doyen 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2018,71(2):319-336
This article analyzes the sustainability of market-based instruments such as tradable permits for the management of a renewable aquifer used for irrigated agriculture. In our dynamic hydro-economic model, a water agency aims at satisfying a food security constraint within a tradable permit scheme in the presence of myopic heterogeneous agents. We identify analytically the viability kernel that defines the states of the resource yielding inter-temporal feasible paths able to satisfy the set of constraints over time and the associated set of viable quota policies. We then illustrate the theoretical results of the paper with numerical simulations based on the Western La Mancha aquifer. 相似文献
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