Shaping the castle according to the rocks in the path? Perceived discrimination,social differences,and subjective wellbeing as determinants of firm type among immigrant entrepreneurs

This paper argues that transnational entrepreneurs are characterized in terms of their differing perceptions of the host society in comparison to conventional immigrant entrepreneurs. We focus on three aspects of individuals’ perception of informal institutions which include (1) individuals’ perception of discrimination based on first-person and third-person experience, (2) individuals’ perception of social differences, and (3) subjective wellbeing. We find that among other immigrant entrepreneurs, transnational entrepreneurs are more likely to perceive social differences within the host society, to have been discriminated against, and experience dissatisfaction regarding opportunities and income.     

Technology Choice and Coalition Formation in Standards Wars

We study the efficiency of the standard-setting process when standards result from competition between groups of firms sponsoring different technologies. We show that ex ante agreements may decrease welfare in the case of standards wars: Even though industry profits are larger with ex ante agreements, welfare is not necessarily larger, because the interests of firms and society may not be aligned. This result contrasts with the findings of previous works studying de jure monopoly standards. Including adopters in the standard-setting process may restore the efficiency of ex ante agreements.     

Innovative outcomes from migrant entrepreneurship: a matter of whether you think you can,or think you can’t

The entrepreneurship literature has exposed some of the most influential antecedents of innovative entrepreneurship. Prior research has also identified crucial features of migrant entrepreneurship. This article employs lessons from these two areas and draws on social cognitive theory to explore the main drivers of innovative ventures among migrants. We center the attention on entrepreneurs, differentiating them between two management strategies: imitation or innovation; and we study the role of perceived self-efficacy, prior entrepreneurial experience, and social capital into the likelihood of acting innovative. For our empirical analysis, we primarily use data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor for three years covering 2016–2018 and gathering 5713 observations of early-stage entrepreneurs from Chile. Our estimations show that being a migrant is in itself an insufficient condition to influence seeking substantial differentiation from what is traditionally offered in the local market; instead, we confirm that a migrant who feels capable of successfully starting a business will be likely to conduct innovative entrepreneurship. Contributions of these findings for theoretical and practical advances of the field are discussed.

     

The form of incentive contracts: agency with moral hazard,risk neutrality,and limited liability

The analysis obtains a complete characterization of the optimal agency contract with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability. We introduce a “critical ratio” that indicates the returns to providing the agent with incentives for effort in each random state. The form of the contract is debt (a capped bonus) when the critical ratio is increasing (decreasing) in the state. An increasing critical ratio in the state‐space setting corresponds to the hazard rate order for the reduced‐form distribution of output, which we term the “decreasing hazard rate in effort property” (DHREP). The critical ratio also yields insights into agency with adverse selection.     

Age-differentiated minimum wages in developing countries

The fact that minimum wages seem especially binding for young workers has led some countries to adopt age-differentiated minimum wages. We develop a dynamic competitive two-sector labor market model where workers with heterogeneous initial skills gain productivity through experience. We compare two equally binding schemes of single and age-differentiated minimum wages, and find that although differentiated minimum wages result in a more equal distribution of income, such a scheme creates a more unequal distribution of wealth by forcing less skilled workers to remain longer in the uncovered sector. We also show that relaxing minimum wage solely for young workers reduces youth unemployment but harms the less skilled ones.