All–Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards

We study all–pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.     

Block-Rate versus Uniform Water Pricing in Agriculture: An Empirical Analysis

In this article we adapt Burtless and Hausman's (1978) methodology in order to estimate farmers' demand for irrigation water under increasing block-rate tariffs and empirically assess its effect on aggregate demand and inter-farm allocation efficiency. This methodology overcomes the technical challenges raised by increasing block-rate pricing and accounts for both observed and unobserved technological heterogeneity among farmers. Employing micro panel data documenting irrigation levels and prices in 185 Israeli agricultural communities in the period 1992–1997, we estimate water demand elasticity at −0.3 in the short run (the effect of a price change on demand within a year of implementation) and −0.46 in the long run. We also find that, in accordance with common belief, switching from a single to a block-price regime, yields a 7% reduction in average water use while maintaining the same average price. However, based on our simulations we estimate that the switch to block prices will result in a loss of approximately 1% of agricultural output due to inter-farm allocation inefficiencies.     

Incentives for voluntary disclosure

Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal–agent contracts between owners – contract designers – and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms’ voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news.     

Characterization of a class of moral-hazard, adverse selection games

Studying a principal-agent game in which the agent alone observes the state of the world and reports it, but the moral hazard is not reducible, shows that, if the principal uses all signals, then no solution exists, i.e. there is no contract that elicits truth-telling and motivates the agent to exert effort. When the principal does not use signals on the state of the world that seem irrelevant, a solution exists in which some of the ex post signals on outcome are not used, even though they obey the informativeness condition of Holmstrom (Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10, 74–91).     

Observable Consequences of Trading Structure Differences: On the Use of Variance Ratios in Microstructure Studies

This paper examines the variance ratio tests in studies of transitory volatility and concludes that the variance ratio is an appropriate test of trading structure differences only under certain assumptions regarding the evolution of underlying stock prices and the autocorrelation structure of returns. This result raises caution as to the interpretation of results bases upon the 24-hour variance ratio methodologies in studies of transitory volatility and trading structure effects. A numerical example indicates that errors in inferences can be severe.     

Identifying micro-destinations and providing statistical information: a pilot study in the Canary Islands

Municipalities and regions are often used as an object of tourism analysis at the subnational level. This occurs because administrative borders are used to implement tourism policies and collect statistical information. However, administrative boundaries may not always be suitable for studying tourism destinations at a local level. Sometimes, particularly in high-density tourism destinations, several differentiated tourism areas occupy a single municipality; tourism areas may, and often do, extend beyond municipal boundaries and tourism destinations may not occupy the whole of the municipal area. As such, a new level of analysis is often required: the micro-destination. There are few tourism concepts as imprecise as that of the destination. Therefore, the process of identifying and establishing the boundaries of a micro-destination is by no means a straightforward one. This paper presents six criteria for establishing the boundaries of this type of tourism area. Of these six, the two primary criteria used are: the concentration of tourism establishments; and tourism typologies and supply characteristics. These criteria have been applied as part of a pilot study in the Canary Islands. Statistical information for nine micro-destinations is generated using the geolocation of tourism establishments together with information obtained from both supply-side and demand-side surveys.     

Charitable Donations: Evidence of Demand for Environmental Protection?

Using data from the 2001 Giving and Volunteering in the United States survey, I examine household charitable donations to environmental organizations. Household income has a positive impact on environmental giving. While the tax price affects overall charitable contributions, it does not affect environmental giving. More education, being female, homeownership, and voting are also associated with a greater likelihood of contributing to the environment. African-Americans and Latinos are less likely to contribute to the environment, although conditional on giving, Latinos give more. Retired persons and households with children are less likely to contribute to the environment. Larger households give less to the environment. Households from the Northeast are the most likely to make environmental contributions while households from the South are the least likely.

“A profit table or a profit calculator?” A note on the design of Cournot oligopoly experiments

We report on an experiment conducted to evaluate the effects of varying the way in which market information is presented to participants in laboratory Cournot duopolies. We find that the most standard variations, which are the use of a profit table or a profit calculator, yield indistinguishable performance. However, the addition of a best-response option to the profit calculator tends to increase aggregate output to the Cournot level and decrease the incidence of tacit collusion.     

On the role of social wage comparisons in gift-exchange experiments

This study extends a bilateral gift-exchange experiment by Clark et al. (2010). We investigate how the provision of either quantitative or qualitative information on the average wage paid in all worker-employer relationships impacts the wage set by employers and worker performance. We find that information on the average wage reduces (increases) both wage offers and effort levels in one-shot (repeated) relationships.