Power in Profit-Maximizing Organizations

I study how profit-maximizing organizations make decisions. Members of organizations tend to have incompatible preferences over decisions, but willingness to pay for decisions plays a very limited role in actual decision making. A sizable empirical literature documents that people who provide critical services, are hard to replace, or deal effectively with external shocks are powerful; they have disproportionate influence over decisions. This can be profit maximizing because the right to shape the firm through its decisions renders the firm more attractive as an employer. Thus, the relative costliness of employees' departures should affect their relative power.     

Process- Versus Function-Based Hierarchies

I consider a firm's choice between having people who carry out complementary tasks report to the same manager and having them report to separate, function-based managers. Even supposing that the former enhances coordination, the latter may be preferred because it improves the firm's control over employees. I show that, because switching from a function-based hierarchy to a process-based hierarchy reduces the firm's direct control, it raises the attractiveness of making the employee pay more sensitive to performance. Also, this switch tends to raise the profitability of fostering altruism between employees. I extend the analysis so that it deals with the relative benefits of IT- and M-form organizations. I show that the M form becomes more profitable as the firm gets large.     

Populism and the return of the “Paranoid Style”: Some evidence and a simple model of demand for incompetence as insurance against elite betrayal

We present a simple model of populism as the rejection of “disloyal” leaders. We show that adding the assumption that people are worse off when they experience low income as a result of leader betrayal (than when it is the result of bad luck) to a simple voter choice model yields a preference for incompetent leaders even if all leaders have the same underlying probability of betrayal. These deliver worse material outcomes in general, but they reduce the feelings of betrayal during bad times. Some evidence consistent with our model is gathered from the Trump–Clinton 2016 election: on average, subjects primed with the importance of competence in policymaking decrease their support for Trump, the candidate who scores lower on competence in our survey (even amongst Trump supporters). But two groups respond to the treatment with a large (approximately 5 percentage points) increase in their support for Donald Trump: those living in rural areas and those that are low educated, white and living in urban and suburban areas.     

Environmental taxes on intermediate and final goods when both can be imported

One of the most difficult administrative problems in implementing broad-based environmental taxes concerns the tax treatment of imports, particularly imports of final goods that are producedusing intermediate goods that are taxed domestically. Provided there is no joint production, taxing imported final goods based on the amount of intermediate goods consumed in their domestic production will raise marginal costs by the same amount for domestic and foreign producers. This rule is impossible to implement when final goods are produced as joint products, however, as in the petroleum refining and petrochemical industries. In such cases arbitrary assignments of intermediate good inputs to final goods-for example, on the basis of relative output weight or value-are likely to change the relative marginal costs of domestic and foreign producers.     

Minimally altruistic wages and unemployment in a matching model with monopsony

A monopsony model with a symmetric equilibrium is developed where posting higher wages reduces employee departures. This monopsony implies that wage changes have small effects on profits so that employer altruism affects wages as well. Even selfish firms act altruistically if workers punish firms that fail to do so. If the marginal utility of income falls sharply with income, the model can explain modest responses of wages to shifts in labor demand. If there are fluctuations in the altruism required by workers, the low correlation of wages and employment and the sizes of the cyclical fluctuations in these two series can be rationalized.     

The efficiency of equilibrium traffic flows

This paper studies the behavior of an optimizing driver on a freeway and the equilibrium speed at which specified flows of traffic move. It shows that both when passing is not allowed (the standard car-following framework of the engineering literature) and when it is permitted, the equilibria tend to exhibit speeds below the Pareto optimal speeds. The flat congestion toll proposed by Oron, Pines and Sheshinski (1973) does not, by itself, bring about Pareto optimality.