Separating microstructure noise from volatility

There are two variance components embedded in the returns constructed using high frequency asset prices: the time-varying variance of the unobservable efficient returns that would prevail in a frictionless economy and the variance of the equally unobservable microstructure noise. Using sample moments of high frequency return data recorded at different frequencies, we provide a simple and robust technique to identify both variance components.     

Indonesian Local Government Spending,Taxing and Saving: An Explanation of Pre‐ and Post‐decentralization Fiscal Outcomes*

As a result of Indonesia's decentralization program, local governments have gained significantly more responsibility for service delivery, considerably larger fiscal resources, and much greater authority over the use of those resources than before. The present paper develops a simple budget model to describe and explain the substantial differences in pre‐ and post‐decentralization local government fiscal behavior related to spending, taxing and saving. During the post‐decentralization period special attention is paid to the fiscal behavior of natural resource rich regions. Among other things, the evidence suggests that: post‐decentralization local government spending is partly responsive to increasing needs and partly the subject of elite capture; local government taxation has become more aggressive under decentralization and appears to be mostly driven by local bureaucratic expectations related to routine overhead budgets; and the increased savings of local governments during the post‐decentralization period is determined to a large degree by delayed central government transfer payments.     

减少汽车业的浪费

汽车制造商和零件供应商可以节省巨大开支，但前提是双方要更为紧密地合作在一起麦肯锡的研究表明，北美汽车业每年在产品开发和组装过程中由于汽车生产商与供应商缺乏良好的计划和协调不当，造成了超过100亿美元的浪费。事实上．这只是较为保守的估算。因为我们的研究仅涵盖了供应商发生的成本，如：附加设计、生产工具最后改型和零件自身的附加成本。这还不包括因设计问题生产商需额外支付的改型费用、生产问题引发的车辆最终成本的增加或质保支出。这几项每年给汽车行业带来的浪费约为120亿美元。     

The Zilcha criterion for dynamic inefficiency

Summary. This paper reexamines the condition (1 + n), which Zilcha (1991) presents as a necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic inefficiency of stationary allocations in overlapping generation models with stochastic production. We show that this condition is necessary but not sufficient for a stationary allocation to be dynamically inefficient by Zilchas definition. We also show that there is a narrow but widely studied class of specifications in which the Zilcha test is both necessary and sufficient for dynamic inefficiency of stationary competitive equilibrium allocations. Outside this class, however, counterexamples can be constructed relatively easily.Received: 30 September 2002, Revised: 13 August 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D90, E13, E22. Correspondence to: Steven RussellWe thank Jon Burke, Subir Chakrabarti, Itzhak Zilcha and an anonymous referee for helpful conversations and/or comments.     

Class length and student performance: An extended study

Many accounting educators believe that the student learning of accounting is better facilitated over a longer period of time, rather than a shorter period of time. This study examined the results of student performance in two introductory accounting courses, comparing student performance results of four-week summer classes with the results of traditional 16-week courses. In this research, the same professor taught the spring and summer ACC 201 courses, and two other professors taught both the spring and summer ACC 211 courses. Also held constant were the lecture material, course assignment, and test content. The results of the study indicate that in general, students taking introductory accounting over four weeks fare about as well as students who take introductory accounting over a traditional 16-week period. These results have potential importance beyond accounting education and provide support to universities offering more block courses to better serve individual student needs.     

Aggregation bias, compositional change, and the border effect

Borders affect the composition, not only the level, of interregional trade. In disaggregated U.S. Commodity Flow data, border effects vary substantially across commodities. Substantial border–induced compositional change suggests the possibility that standard estimates suffer from aggregation bias arising from endogenous industry location patterns and the presence of zero observations in commodity–level trade. Adjusting for these effects reduces the estimate of the aggregate border effect from 20.9 to 5.7. JEL Classification: F14, F15
Biais d'agrégation, changement de composition, et effet de frontières. Les frontières affectent la composition et pas seulement le volume de commerce inter-régional. Une analyse des données désagrégées des flux de commerce de biens des Etats-Unis montre que l'effet de frontières varie substantiellement selon les biens. Le changement de composition du commerce engendré par les frontières suggère la possibilité que les estimations usuelles souffrent d'un biais d'agrégation résultant des patterns de localisation industrielle endogènes et de la présence d'observations nulles dans le commerce de certains biens. Un ajustement pour tenir compte de ces effets suggère que les effets de frontières passent de 20.9 à 5.7.     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.