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Giulio Seccia 《Economic Theory》2000,16(2):323-332
Summary. A simple example shows that although non-convexities might prevent the existence of a fully revealing rational expectations
equilibrium, they need not prevent the existence of a non-informative one. Indeed, the economy in this example does not possess
any fully revealing equilibria, but does have a continuum of non-informative ones.
Received: February 9, 1999; revised version: October 20, 1999 相似文献
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In this paper, we introduce the psychological concept of anxiety into agency theory. An important benchmark in the anxiety literature is the inverted-U hypothesis, which states that an increase in anxiety improves performance when anxiety is low, but reduces it when anxiety is high. We show that the inverted-U hypothesis is consistent with evidence that high-powered incentives can reduce the agent's optimal effort and expected performance. In equilibrium, however, a profit-maximizing principal never offers such counterproductive incentives. We also show that the inverted-U hypothesis can explain empirical anomalies related to monitoring, the informativeness principle, and the risk–reward tradeoff. 相似文献
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In this article, we show that a standard economic model, the endogenous learning‐by‐doing model, captures several major themes from the anxiety literature in psychology. In our model, anxiety is a fully endogenous construct that can be separated naturally into its cognitive and physiological components. As such, our results are directly comparable with hypotheses and evidence from psychology. We show that anxiety can serve a motivating function, which suggests potential applications in the principal–agent literature.
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This paper studies economies with complete markets where there is positive default on consumer debt. In a simple tractable two-period model, households can default partially, at a finite punishment cost, and competitive intermediaries price loans of different sizes separately. This environment yields only partial insurance. The default-based pricing of debt makes it too costly for the borrower to achieve full insurance, and there is too little trade in securities. This framework is in contrast to existing literature. Unlike the literature with default, there are no restrictions on the set of state contingent securities that are issued. Unlike the literature on lack of commitment, limited trade arises without need of debt constraints that rule default out. Compared with the latter, the present approach appears to imply more consumption inequality. An extended model with an infinite horizon, idiosyncratic risk and more realistic assumptions is used to demonstrate the general validity of this approach and its main implications. 相似文献
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