Ownership structure and golden parachutes: Evidence of credible commitment or incentive alignment?

Using a sample of S & P 500 firms, we find that golden parachutes are associated with concentrated external ownership, less concentrated internal ownership, and non-Delaware incorporation. We find little support that concentrated external owners use golden parachutes as credible commitment devices. The general multivariate results support the incentive alignment hypothesis, and reaffirm the view that golden parachutes are a mechanism used to align managerial and shareholder interests when there is a separation between ownership and control. (JEL G32)     

Memory recall errors in retrospective surveys: A reverse record check study

This paper reports on a study to compare self-reports during an interview with staff who attended a University health centre in Turkey, with the records of visits to the same health centre over the previous 12 months. Design of the study reflects the effects of importance of the event, duration since the event, frequency of the occurrence of the event, measurement scale of the event, and bounded and unbounded recalling. In order to assess the extent of recall error, responses to retrospective questions on health centre visits are compared with administrative records. Statistical models are proposed for short and long term human memory recall error effects on responses.     

Selecting container port via a fuzzy ANP-based approach: A case study in the Marmara Region,Turkey

In this case study, a real world problem of a production firm in the Marmara Region, Turkey was considered. In the current situation, the firm works with different third-party logistics firms and uses different ports each time. However, they have some quality problems and decided to work with a logistics firm by using the most convenient port alternative. A number of conflicting qualitative and quantitative criteria exist for evaluating alternative ports. Qualitative criteria are often accompanied by ambiguities and vagueness. To cope with this problem, the fuzzy analytic network process (FANP) method is used in this study. First, we defined the region specific criteria consisting of the twenty sub-criteria under the six main criteria clusters that influence the selection of container port. Then seven alternative container ports located in the Marmara Sea were determined. The results showed that the most convenient district for the container port is Istanbul District, which is one of the biggest economical centers in Eastern Europe.     

Firm‐Size Wage Gaps along the Formal‐Informal Divide: Theory and Evidence

Observationally equivalent workers are paid higher wages in larger firms. This fact is often called the “firm‐size wage gap” and is regarded as a key empirical puzzle. Using microlevel data from Turkey, we document a new stylized fact: The firm‐size wage gap is more pronounced for informal (unregistered) jobs than for formal (registered) jobs. To explain this fact, we develop a two‐stage wage‐posting game with market imperfections and segmented markets, the solution to which produces wages as a function of firm size in a well‐defined subgame‐perfect equilibrium. The model proposes two explanations. First, taxes on formal employment generate a wedge between formal and informal size wage gaps. Thus, government policy can potentially affect the magnitude of the firm‐size wage gaps. The second explanation features a market‐based framework with strategic interactions. Relative to small firms, large firms typically post higher wages for both formal and informal jobs. A high‐wage formal job attracts a larger pool of applicants than a high‐wage informal job. The larger pool of applicants for the formal job, in turn, allows the firm to somewhat lower the initial wage offer, while this second‐round effect is negligible for informal jobs. As a result, size differentials are lower in formal jobs than informal jobs. We argue that the observed patterns in the use of social connections in job search and heterogeneity in job preferences can be used to justify the validity of this second mechanism.     

Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design

This paper studies a simple setting in which the contractual arrangements which determine the incentives for agents are not designed by a single central planner, but are themselves the outcome of a game among multiple noncooperatively acting principals. The notion of an Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium is introduced to predict the outcome of the contract-design game among principals. Symmetric pure strategy Epsilon Contracting Equlibria may not exist in perfectly symmetric environments. In a symmetric Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium in mixed strategies coordination failure may lead to a suboptimal institutional network in which the agents “cheat” their principals. Received: 14 June 1995 / Accepted: 09 August 1999     

Every member of the core is as respectful as any other

We strategically separate different core outcomes. The natural counterparts of a core allocation in a strategic environment are the α-core, the β-core and the strong equilibrium, modified by assuming that utility is transferable in a strategic context as well. Given a core allocation ω of a convex transferable utility (TU) game \(v\), we associate a strategic coalition formation game with \( \left( {v, \omega } \right) \) in which ω survives, while most other core allocations are eliminated. If the TU game is strictly convex, the core allocations respected by the TU-α-core, the TU-β-core and the TU-strong equilibrium shrink to ω only in the canonical family of coalition formation games associated with \( \left( {v, \omega } \right) \). A mechanism, which strategically separates core outcomes from noncore outcomes for each convex TU game according to the TU-strong equilibrium notion is reported.     

Traveling to your match? Assessing the predictive potential of Plog’s travel personality in destination marketing

This study revisits .Plog’s travel personality model in a true experimental setting and tests the model’s predictive power. The specific aim is to examine whether attitudinal and behavioral responses toward a destination vary as a function of the congruity between the tourist’s travel personality and the characteristics of the destination as perceived from an advertising message. The concept of self-congruity serves as a foundation for the theoretical framework. Results indicate message-personality congruity had a significant influence on visit intention via attitudes as mediators. This study provides theoretical implications for the predictive potential of Plog’s model as well as strategic marketing implications for destinations.