Consumer perspectives on the African sharptooth catfish in rural and urban areas of the Northern Province

This study evaluated consumer behavioural patterns in relation to meat products, with special reference to the African sharptooth catfish, in the Northern Province. Personal interviews were conducted in rural Ga‐Mamphaka and urban Giyani. The major meat type purchased was found to be chicken (71 per cent in the rural and 46 per cent in the urban community). The sharptooth catfish was found to be acceptable to the majority of respondents, both urban (69 per cent) and rural (57 per cent). Most respondents also indicated that they would like to purchase canned catfish. A potential market for catfish would seem to exist at a price competitive with that of chicken.     

Bracing for survival

As health care continues to move toward smaller, more consolidated support services, materiel managers will face constricted promotion and employment opportunities. Flexibility and a willingness to embrace change as the occasion for personal and professional advancement will be two hallmarks of success. This article focuses on outsourcing and integrated delivery networks by discussing the challenges and opportunities they present.     

On the economics of trials: adversarial process, evidence, and equilibrium bias

The adversarial provision of evidence is modeled as a game inwhich two parties engage in strategic sequential search. Anaxiomatic approach is used to characterize a court's decisionbased on the evidence provided. Although this process treatsthe evidence submissions in an unbiased way, the equilibriumoutcome may still exhibit bias. Bias arises from differencesin the cost of sampling or asymmetry in the sampling distribution.In a multistage model, a prodefendant bias arises in the firststage from a divergence between the parties' stakes. Finally,the adversarial process generates additional costs that screenout some otherwise meritorious cases.     

Auctions of divisible goods: on the rationale for the treasury experiment

We compare a sealed-bid uniform-price auction (the Treasury'sexperimental format) with a sealed bid discriminatory auction(the Treasury's format heretofore), assuming the good is perfectlydivisible. We show that the auction theory that prompted theexperiment, which assumes single-unit demands, does not adequatelydescribe the bidding game for Treasury securities. Collusivestrategies are self-enforcing in uniform-price divisible-goodauctions. In these equilibria, the seller's expected revenueis lower than in equilibria of discriminatory auctions.