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Stephen Sherlock 《Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies》2002,38(3):367-383
Early optimism that post-Soeharto governments would lead a systematic campaign against corruption has largely been disappointed. The creation of the ombudsman and the Assets Auditing Commission (KPKPN) were hopeful signs, but both initiatives are symptomatic of the weaknesses besetting Indonesia's anti-corruption efforts. Despite their best endeavours, both organisations have weak powers, are under-resourced, receive only token political support and exist in isolation from other investigative and enforcement agencies. International research suggests that official efforts to eliminate corruption are effective only as part of a coordinated campaign to reform administration, policy making, legislative institutions and the judiciary. Threatened exposure or punishment of corrupt officials is not enough: all the institutional incentives and disincentives for abuse of public office for private gain must be confronted. In Indonesia the problem is that most of those empowered to take such initiatives have no incentive to do so because they profit from the status quo. 相似文献
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This study evaluated consumer behavioural patterns in relation to meat products, with special reference to the African sharptooth catfish, in the Northern Province. Personal interviews were conducted in rural Ga‐Mamphaka and urban Giyani. The major meat type purchased was found to be chicken (71 per cent in the rural and 46 per cent in the urban community). The sharptooth catfish was found to be acceptable to the majority of respondents, both urban (69 per cent) and rural (57 per cent). Most respondents also indicated that they would like to purchase canned catfish. A potential market for catfish would seem to exist at a price competitive with that of chicken. 相似文献
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The adversarial provision of evidence is modeled as a game inwhich two parties engage in strategic sequential search. Anaxiomatic approach is used to characterize a court's decisionbased on the evidence provided. Although this process treatsthe evidence submissions in an unbiased way, the equilibriumoutcome may still exhibit bias. Bias arises from differencesin the cost of sampling or asymmetry in the sampling distribution.In a multistage model, a prodefendant bias arises in the firststage from a divergence between the parties' stakes. Finally,the adversarial process generates additional costs that screenout some otherwise meritorious cases. 相似文献
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