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1.
The current note clarifies that Condorcet Jury Theorem cannot be generalized to the extended setting where individual decisional
skills are not assumed to be exogenous parameters even when these skills are homogeneous. This is true when skills are determined
endogenously either by a central planner or, in a decentralized strategic setting, by the decision makers themselves. 相似文献
2.
The Borda rule,Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary. The Borda rule is known to be the least vulnerable scoring rule to Condorcet inconsistency, Saari (2000). Such inconsistency
occurs when the Condorcet winner (the alternative which is preferred to any other alternative by a simple majority) is not
selected by the Borda rule. This note exposes the relationship between the Borda rule and the Condorcet q-majority principle as well as the Condorcet q-majority voting rule. The main result establishes that the Borda rule is Condorcet q-majority consistent when where k is the number of alternatives. The second result establishes that is the minimal degree of majority decisiveness corresponding to the Borda rule under sincere voting. The same majority is
required to ensure decisiveness under the Borda rule and to ensure that a q-rule (the generalized q-majority Condorcet rule) is a voting rule.
Received: April 8, 2002; revised version: July 17, 2002
Correspondence to:S. Nitzan 相似文献
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Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature policy proposals are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities. 相似文献
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The Price of Options Illiquidity 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of illiquidity on the value of currency options. We use a unique dataset that allows us to explore this issue in special circumstances where options are issued by a central bank and are not traded prior to maturity. The value of these options is compared to similar options traded on the exchange. We find that the nontradable options are priced about 21 percent less than the exchange-traded options. This gap cannot be arbitraged away due to transactions costs and the risk that the exchange rate will change during the bidding process. 相似文献
8.
We propose a priority-pricing scheme for zonal access to the electric power grid that is uniform across all buses in a zone. The independent system operator (ISO) charges bulk power traders a per unit ex ante transmission access fee. The zonal access fee serves as an access insurance premium that entitles a bulk power trader to either physical injection of one unit of energy or a compensation payment. The access fee per MWh depends on the injection zone and a self-selected strike price that serves as an insurance deductible that determines the scheduling priority of the insured transaction and the compensation level in case of curtailment. Inter-zonal transactions are charged (or credited) with an additional ex post congestion fee equal to the differences in zonal spot prices. The compensation for curtailed transactions equals the difference between the realized zonal spot price and the selected strike price (deductible level). The ISO manages congestion so as to minimize net compensation payments and thus, curtailment probabilities increase with strike price and for any particular strike price may vary from bus to bus. We calculate the rational expectations equilibrium for three-, four- and six-node systems and demonstrate that the efficiency losses of the proposed second best scheme relative to the efficient dispatch solutions are modest. 相似文献
9.
This paper uses a model similar to the Boyle-Vorst and Ritchken-Kuo arbitrage-free models for the valuation of options with transactions costs to determine the maximum price to be charged by the financial intermediary writing an option in a non-auction market. Earlier models are extended by recognizing that, in the presence of transactions costs, the price-taking intermediary devising a hedging portfolio faces a tradeoff: to choose a short trading interval with small hedging errors and high transactions costs, or a long trading interval with large hedging errors and low transactions costs. The model presented here also recognizes that when transactions costs induce less frequent portfolio adjustments, investors are faced with a multinomial distribution of asset returns rather than a binomial one. The price upper bound is determined by selecting the trading frequency that will equalize the marginal gain from decreasing hedging errors and the marginal cost of transactions. 相似文献
10.
Shmuel Sharir 《Southern economic journal》1999,65(4):953-958
A recent thoughtful paper by Singell and Thornton (thereafter ST) in the Southern Economic Journal deviates in definitions, modeling, and a result from the traditional literature on tastes for discrimination and nepotism that originates with Becker and Arrow. This comment provides a critique of these three aspects of the ST analysis. In particular, it shows that ST's astonishing result that discrimination will persist in a competitive labor market is unjustified, ST's unconventional definitions of owners with unbiased and biased preferences are wrong, and ST's unique modeling of discrimination and nepotism is unsupported. 相似文献