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1.
The Price of Options Illiquidity 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of illiquidity on the value of currency options. We use a unique dataset that allows us to explore this issue in special circumstances where options are issued by a central bank and are not traded prior to maturity. The value of these options is compared to similar options traded on the exchange. We find that the nontradable options are priced about 21 percent less than the exchange-traded options. This gap cannot be arbitraged away due to transactions costs and the risk that the exchange rate will change during the bidding process. 相似文献
2.
Shmuel Weinberger 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,115(2):377-384
The main goal of this paper is to show that if a finite connected CW complex admits a continuous, symmetric, and unanimous choice function for some number n>1 of agents, then the choice space is contractible. On the other hand, if one removes the finiteness, we give a complete characterization of the possible spaces; in particular, noncontractible spaces are indeed possible. These results extend earlier well-known results of Chichilnisky and Heal. 相似文献
3.
4.
Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature policy proposals are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities. 相似文献
5.
The Borda rule,Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary. The Borda rule is known to be the least vulnerable scoring rule to Condorcet inconsistency, Saari (2000). Such inconsistency
occurs when the Condorcet winner (the alternative which is preferred to any other alternative by a simple majority) is not
selected by the Borda rule. This note exposes the relationship between the Borda rule and the Condorcet q-majority principle as well as the Condorcet q-majority voting rule. The main result establishes that the Borda rule is Condorcet q-majority consistent when where k is the number of alternatives. The second result establishes that is the minimal degree of majority decisiveness corresponding to the Borda rule under sincere voting. The same majority is
required to ensure decisiveness under the Borda rule and to ensure that a q-rule (the generalized q-majority Condorcet rule) is a voting rule.
Received: April 8, 2002; revised version: July 17, 2002
Correspondence to:S. Nitzan 相似文献
6.
We analyze welfare and distributional properties of a two-settlement system consisting of a spot market over a two-node network and a single energy forward contract. We formulate and analyze several models which simulate joint dispatch of energy and transmission resources coordinated by a system operator. The spot market is subject to network uncertainty, which we model as a random capacity derating of an important transmission line. Using a duopoly model, we show that even for small probabilities of congestion (derating), forward trading may be substantially reduced, and the market power mitigating effect of forward markets (as shown in Allaz and Vila 1993) may be nullified to a great extent. There is a spot transmission charge reflecting transportation costs from location of generation to a designated hub whose price is the underlying for the forward contract. This alleviates some of the incentive problems associated with the forward market in which spot-market trading is residual. We find that the reduction in forward trading is due to the segregation of the markets in the constrained state, and the absence of natural incentives for generators to commit to more aggressive behavior in the spot market (the strategic substitutes effect). In our analysis, we find that the standard assumption of no-arbitrage across forward and spot markets leads to very little contract coverage, even for the case with no congestion. We present an alternative view of the market where limited intertemporal arbitrage enables temporal price discrimination by competing duopolists. In this framework, we assume that all of the demand shows up in the forward market (or that the market is cleared against an accurate forecast of the demand), and the forward price is determined using a market clearing condition. 相似文献
7.
In the past few years there has been an increasing number of new issues of shares of common stock together with warrants intended to raise interest in initial public offerings of relatively young, growing firms. In this study we examine the pricing efficiency of stocks and warrants offered simultaneously to the public as a single unit. We present a model for evaluating the warrants in such offerings and test it empirically against data from the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange, where such offerings have become standard. We find that the issued units are usually undervalued, allowing for significant abnormal positive returns. But, while the warrants are usually underpriced, the stocks are overpriced. Largely consistent with the evidence from other financial markets around the world, we also find abnormal negative rates of return in the long run. 相似文献
8.
This paper remedies ambiguity in the discussion of interdependent preferences by developing a consistent set of distinctions, which span the full range of sympathetic and antipathetic interaction, for the two-person case without reactive behavior. It defines concepts such as benevolence, generosity, altruism, destructiveness, and willingness to begrrudge transfers to others and indicates how their use can clarify the discussion of economic behavior. The definitions take account of preferences (indicated by rates of substitution) and prices (indicated by rates of exchange) at critical income allocations. 相似文献
9.
Shmuel Sharir 《Southern economic journal》1999,65(4):953-958
A recent thoughtful paper by Singell and Thornton (thereafter ST) in the Southern Economic Journal deviates in definitions, modeling, and a result from the traditional literature on tastes for discrimination and nepotism that originates with Becker and Arrow. This comment provides a critique of these three aspects of the ST analysis. In particular, it shows that ST's astonishing result that discrimination will persist in a competitive labor market is unjustified, ST's unconventional definitions of owners with unbiased and biased preferences are wrong, and ST's unique modeling of discrimination and nepotism is unsupported. 相似文献
10.
Contestability and Pay Differential in the Executive Suites 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
In comparison to the abundant evidence on CEOs' compensations, little is known about the compensation of other senior executives, and on how the pay differential between CEO and other senior executives affects firm performance. We examine several potential explanations of the pay differential in the executive suite, using a sample of 367 Israeli firms listed on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange. The empirical results fail to support the tournament and pay equity models. Instead, our evidence suggests a model where senior executives are encouraged (by the structure implied in their pay contract) to cooperate with each other (the team playing model). In a subset of firms managed by their owners we observe greater pay differentials between the owner-CEO and other senior executives. Interestingly, only in this subset of owner-managed firms, higher pay differentials can be associated with better firm performance. 相似文献