Do small shareholders count?

We hypothesize that age similarity among small shareholders acts as an implicit coordinating device for their actions and, thus, could represent an indirect source of corporate governance in firms with dispersed ownership. We test this hypothesis on a sample of Swedish firms during the 1995-2000 period. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that compared with shareholders of differing ages, same-age noncontrolling shareholders sell more aggressively following negative firm news; firms with more age-similar small shareholders are more profitable and command higher valuation; and an increase (decline) in a firm's small shareholder age similarity brings a significantly large increase (decline) in its stock price. The last effects are more pronounced in the absence of a controlling shareholder.     

Social Interactions and Entrepreneurial Activity

We show that individuals residing in highly entrepreneurial neighborhoods are more likely to become entrepreneurs and invest more into their own businesses, even though their entrepreneurial profits are lower and their alternative job opportunities more attractive. Our results suggest that peer effects create nonpecuniary benefits from entrepreneurial activity and play an important role in the decision to become an entrepreneur. Alternative explanations, such as entry costs, social learning, and informal credit markets, are not supported by the data.     

Firms’ reactions to public information on business practices: The case of search advertising

Quantitative Marketing and Economics - We use five years of bidding data to examine the reaction of advertisers to widely disseminated press on the lack of effectiveness of brand search advertising...     

Hedging, Familiarity and Portfolio Choice

We exploit the restrictions of intertemporal portfolio choicein the presence of nonfinancial income risk to test hedgingusing the information contained in the actual portfolio of theinvestor. We use a unique data set of Swedish investors withinformation broken down at the investor level and into variouscomponents of investor wealth, income, and demographic characteristics.Portfolio holdings are identified at the stock level. We showthat investors do not hedge but invest in stocks closely relatedto their nonfinancial income. We explain this with familiarity,that is, the tendency to concentrate holdings in stocks to whichthe investor is geographically or professionally close or thathe has held for a long period. We show that familiarity is nota behavioral bias, but is information driven. Familiarity-basedinvestment allows investors to earn higher returns than theywould have otherwise earned if they had hedged.     

Alliances and corporate governance

We study the link between a firm's quality of governance and its alliance activity. We consider alliances as a commitment technology that helps a company’ Chief Executive Officer overcome agency problems that relate to the inability to ex ante motivate division managers. We show that well-governed firms are more likely to avail themselves of this technology to anticipate ex post commitment problems and resolve them. The role of governance is particularly important when the commitment problems are more acute, such as for significantly risky/long-horizon projects (“longshots”) or firms more prone to inefficient internal redistribution of resources (conglomerates), as well as in the absence of alternative disciplining devices (e.g., low product market competition). Governance also mitigates agency issues between alliance partners; dominant alliance partners agree to a more equal split of power with junior partners that are better governed. An “experiment” that induces cross-sectional variation in the cost of the alliance commitment technology provides evidence of a causal link between governance and alliances.     

Behavioral Biases and Investment

We investigate the way investors react to prior gains/losses. We directly examine investor reactions to different definitions of gains and losses (i.e., overall wealth, paper gains and losses, and realized capital gains and losses) and investigate how gains and losses in one category of wealth (e.g., real estate) affect holdings in other categories (e.g., financial assets). We show that investors change their holdings of risky assets as a function of both financial and real estate gains. Prior gains increase risk-taking, while prior losses reduce it. To interpret our results, we consider and compare three alternative hypotheses of investor behavior: prospect theory, house money effect and standard utility theory with decreasing risk aversion. Our evidence fails to support loss aversion, pointing in the direction of the house money effect or standard utility theory. Investors consider wealth in its entirety, and risk-taking in financial markets is affected by gains/losses in overall wealth, financial wealth, and real estate wealth. We appreciate the helpful comments of: O. Bondarenko, F. De Jong, B. Dumas, H. Hau, P. Hillion, R. Jaganathan, M. Lettau, P.Maenhout, M. Huang, S. Mullanaithen, T. Odean, J. Peress, R. Shiller, P. Sodini, M. Suominen, A. Subrahmanyan, B. Swaminathan, R. Thaler, L. Tepla, P. Veronesi, M. Weber and the participants of the Summer Financial Markets Symposium at Gerzensee and the NBER Behavioral Finance Meeting, Fall 2002. We are grateful to Sven-Ivan Sundqvist for numerous helpful discussions and for providing us with the data. Financial support from Inquiry Europe is acknowledged. Andrei Simonov also acknowledges financial support from the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation. Any remaining errors are our own.