The law of one price: a test based on prices for selected inputs in New Zealand agriculture

The law of one price (LOOP) is an essential foundation of both the pure theory of trade and monetary theory. Strictly speaking, the law relates to prices of individual commodities. However, empirical tests of LOOP have often relied on aggregated data. In this paper, a model is derived and estimated using price data for 15 selected inputs in New Zealand agriculture. The results offer no support for the LOOP in the short run, and the results for the long run are mixed. It may be inappropriate, therefore, to assume that the LOOP holds generally in modelling exercises, particularly when models are used for policy purposes.     

Open interest,volume, and volatility: evidence from Taiwan futures markets

This paper examines the relationships amongst volatility, total trading volume (TVOL) and total open interest (TOI) for three Taiwan stock index futures markets as well as the role of the latter two variables in the dynamics of GARCH modeling and forecasting. From both ex-post and ex-ante perspectives, we study this issue by using the VAR model and augmented GARCH-type models, respectively. For the GARCH-type models, we employ both symmetric and asymmetric models augmented with lagged logs in TOI and/or TVOL. We find that whether addition of these two variables helps the basic GARCH models predict future volatility depends upon the sample period examined for all three sets of futures. Nonetheless, the best three models for out-of-sample volatility forecasting in the MSE sense are generally the augmented models for all sub-intervals and all three futures contracts.     

Gini-PLS Regressions

Journal of Quantitative Economics - Data contamination and excessive correlations between regressors (multicollinearity) constitute a standard and major problem in econometrics. Two techniques...     

Einzelbesprechungen

Ohne ZusammenfassungÜbersetzt von Hans Fried, Wien.     

Einzelbesprechungen

Ohne ZusammenfassungAus dem Italienischen übersetzt von M. St. Braun, WienAus dem Russischen übersetzt von A. GerschenkronAus dem Italienischen übersetzt von Erich Allina     

Long-term health economic benefits of sensor-augmented pump therapy vs continuous subcutaneous insulin infusion alone in type 1 diabetes: a UK perspective

Aims/hypothesis:

Continuous subcutaneous insulin infusion (CSII) is an important treatment option for type 1 diabetes patients unable to achieve adequate glycemic control with multiple daily injections (MDI). Combining CSII with continuous glucose monitoring (CGM) in sensor-augmented pump therapy (SAP) with a low glucose-suspend (LGS) feature may further improve glycemic control and reduce the frequency of hypoglycemia. A cost-effectiveness analysis of SAP?+?LGS vs CSII plus self-monitoring of blood glucose (SMBG) was performed to determine the health economic benefits of SAP?+?LGS in type 1 diabetes patients using CSII in the UK.

Methods:

Cost-effectiveness analysis was performed using the CORE diabetes model. Treatment effects were sourced from the literature, where SAP?+?LGS was associated with a projected HbA_1c reduction of ?1.49% vs ?0.62% for CSII, and a reduced frequency of severe hypoglycemia. The time horizon was that of patient lifetimes; future costs and clinical outcomes were discounted at 3.5% and 1.5% per annum, respectively.

Results:

Projected outcomes showed that SAP?+?LGS was associated with higher mean quality-adjusted life expectancy (17.9 vs 14.9 quality-adjusted life years [QALYs], SAP?+?LGS vs CSII), and higher life expectancy (23.8 vs 21.9 years), but higher mean lifetime direct costs (GBP 125,559 vs GBP 88,991), leading to an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of GBP 12,233 per QALY gained for SAP?+?LGS vs CSII. Findings of the base-case analysis remained robust in sensitivity analyses.

Conclusions/interpretation:

For UK-based type 1 diabetes patients with poor glycemic control, the use of SAP?+?LGS is likely to be cost-effective compared with CSII plus SMBG.     

Should the Good and the Selfish be Taxed Differently?*

In this paper, we consider an environment where individual actions have externalities and two types of agents exist: agents with social preferences (the good) and selfish agents. Selfish agents have pay‐off functions that do not take into account social welfare. The pay‐off of an agent is a linear combination of social welfare and the pay‐off of a selfish agent. We demonstrate that the corrective tax rates that maximize social welfare do not depend on the degree of social preferences. Hence, the good and the selfish should not be taxed differently.