This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (J Math Econ 1:23–37, 1974). We study secure
implementation (Saijo et al. in Theor Econ 2:203–229, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash
equilibria. We prove that (1) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (2) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (3) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization
of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case: a solution is securely implementable if and only if it is either
a constant solution or a serial dictatorship. 相似文献
Previous empirical studies have shown that perceptions of organizational politics are negatively related to individuals’ affective commitment. The key contribution of this study was that it found the interactive moderating effects of political skill and quality of leader–member exchange (LMX) on the relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and affective commitment. Our results indicated that politics perception affective commitment relationship was weaker when both political skill and quality of LMX are high. When only political skill is high and the quality of LMX is low, or LMX quality is high but political skill is low, the negative relationship between politics perception and affective commitment was not mitigated. Limitations and implications for future research are discussed. 相似文献
The objective of this study was to unravel the challenges confronting women of color (WoC)-owned small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the United States. This is based on findings that most WoC-owned SMEs fail within the first few years of establishment. The impact of the global financial crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic on WoC-owned SMEs was also explored. System Dynamics (SD) is a computational modeling approach useful for understanding changes in a system over time and is applied in this study to illustrate WoC entrepreneurs' navigation through the startup and maturation of SMEs. The authors calibrated and validated the model with publicly available data. Findings revealed that more emphasis should be placed on failure reduction in the early years of establishment of these businesses. Also, there is the need for early intervention rather than focusing on the improvement of the successful business exit from the system. Results indicated that the creation of new businesses by WoC after the failure of existing businesses produced an increase in the number of failed enterprises. The authors assert that attention must be paid at the individual level through support to the entrepreneur. This study contributes to the extant literature by providing the first known SD model useful in depicting the SME system for WoC entrepreneurs in the US. The model serves as a potentially useful tool for informing effective policy making, education, and programmatic approaches to support the success of WoC entrepreneurs in the US.
We examine how Japanese listed companies increase the number of outside directors to comply with corporate governance reforms. We find that, after the reforms, there has been an increase in the number of cases in which former company auditors (kansayaku) become outside directors in the same company. This trend is more pronounced for hitherto noncompliant firms with insufficient outside directors before the reforms. Moreover, the firms appointing company auditors as outside directors tend to change their corporate structures to maintain existing practices and minimize compliance costs. Our findings imply that Japanese reforms have increased the unnatural selection of outside directors. 相似文献
This study investigates determinants of debt covenants in Japanese loan markets. We focus on a unique monitoring mechanism by Japanese banks and hypothesise that debt covenants substitute for the traditional main bank governance. Consistently, we find that debt covenants are less likely to be used for firms with stronger ties with their main banks. We also document that such use of debt covenants results in borrower’s upward earnings management. Overall, our evidence suggests that, in the Japanese context, debt covenants are used as a substitute for the main bank system yet they alone are an incomplete monitoring mechanism. 相似文献
Experimental Economics - We conduct laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. The rate of truth-telling among the subjects... 相似文献
We demonstrate that in highly productive economies contract enforcement institutions are endogenously established, and partnership contracts correct inefficient land allocation. In less productive economies, however, such institutions are not established, and partnership contracts are not formed. In economies with intermediate productivity levels, multiple Nash equilibria exist; that is, contract enforcement institutions are established in the high Nash equilibrium whereas they are not formed in the low Nash equilibrium. In this case, institutional quality can be diverse across economies. We also prove that improvement in institutional quality reduces within‐country inequality. All these outcomes are consistent with cross‐country observations. 相似文献
In this paper, we study the existence of asset bubbles in an overlapping generations economy à la Tirole [Tirole, J., 1985. Asset bubbles and overlapping generations. Econometrica 53, 1499–1528] with borrowing constraints. Deriving a condition for the existence of equilibrium paths with bubbles, we demonstrate that (i) a monetary steady state (a steady state with bubbles) is constrained dynamically inefficient, whereas capital in the monetary steady state is underaccumulating relative to the quasi-golden rule, (ii) there exists a government intervention which corrects the constrained dynamic inefficiency, and (iii) for some parameter values, such a government intervention reduces the utilities of agents with high productivity, while it increases per capita consumption. 相似文献
An economy in which entrepreneurs and financiers interact with each other through an imperfect financial market is investigated by applying a dynamic general equilibrium theory. In each period, there is a certain probability of each entrepreneur's life ending, and a certain number of entrepreneurs are newly born. Although entrepreneurs are potential capital producers, they receive an idiosyncratic productivity shock in each period. Therefore, entrepreneurs who draw higher productivity become capital producers and those who draw lower productivity become lenders. Financiers do not have an entrepreneurial talent for capital production, and thus they lend their assets in the financial market to acquire an interest income. In equilibrium, deterministic endogenous business cycles can occur at the intermediate level of financial constraints. 相似文献