高管校友关系与业绩预测披露行为

本文考察高管对个人社会关系的依赖是否对上市公司的信息环境产生冲击;具体的,本文系统论证了高管校友关系和上市公司信息披露的重要载体—管理层业绩预测之间的关系.结果显示,当公司与其供应商的高管之间存在校友关系或校友关系更广泛时,公司发布管理层业绩预测的概率和频数均显著下降,即高管校友一定程度上取代了业绩预测,成为了供应链上的信息流通渠道.进一步分析显示,当公司的私有信息成本较高或经营环境更不确定时,校友关系对业绩预测的替代作用更强;而当供应商议价能力较强时,这种替代作用显著下降.此外,本文发现高管校友关系也显著降低了业绩预测发布的自愿性和及时性.最后,本文发现校友关系引起的业绩预测披露减少,削弱了外部信息使用者获取公司层面信息的程度,表现为股价同步性和分析师预测分歧度加大.本文结果表明,高管对个人社会关系的依赖降低了上市公司的信息环境质量,可能使中小投资者处于更弱势的地位,一定程度上损害了市场公平性.本文将个人社会关系的经济影响拓展到信息环境领域,为社会关系如何影响公开信息披露行为提供了新的经验证据.     

State‐Dependent Forward Guidance and the Problem of Inconsistent Announcements

Forward guidance can be provided as an unconditional promise, i.e. commitment to a specific low policy rate. Alternatively, the promise may include an escape clause, i.e. a condition defining the state of the economy under which the central bank would not keep such a low rate and, instead, it would revert to setting policy under discretion. The escape clause can be expressed as a threshold in terms of a specific variable. The present paper shows that, when such a threshold is expressed in terms of an endogenous variable (e.g. output, inflation), there are cases where it becomes impossible for the central bank to act in a way that is consistent with its promise. Consistency imposes limits on the policy rate that can be set since reverting immediately to the optimal discretionary rate can be incompatible with exceeding the threshold.     

EMPIRICAL PERFORMANCE OF GARCH MODELS WITH HEAVY‐TAILED INNOVATIONS

We introduce a new type of heavy‐tailed distribution, the normal reciprocal inverse Gaussian distribution (NRIG), to the GARCH and Glosten‐Jagannathan‐Runkle (1993) GARCH models, and compare its empirical performance with two other popular types of heavy‐tailed distribution, the Student's t distribution and the normal inverse Gaussian distribution (NIG), using a variety of asset return series. Our results illustrate that there is no overwhelmingly dominant distribution in fitting the data under the GARCH framework, although the NRIG distribution performs slightly better than the other two types of distribution. For market indexes series, it is important to introduce both GJR‐terms and the NRIG distribution to improve the models’ performance, but it is ambiguous for individual stock prices series. Our results also show the GJR‐GARCH NRIG model has practical advantages in quantitative risk management. Finally, the convergence of numerical solutions in maximum‐likelihood estimation of GARCH and GJR‐GARCH models with the three types of heavy‐tailed distribution is investigated.     

Foreign direct investment subsidy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms

This study analyzes the macroeconomic impacts of subsidies to attract multinational corporations when firms are determining whether to enter or how to serve foreign markets. We show that a small FDI subsidy scheme induces consumption gains and delivers short‐term welfare improvement for the FDI host country if firms differ in productivity. However, the subsidy generates a new problem and results in the wealth reallocation effect, leading to welfare deterioration for the host country in the long run. Moreover, we find that a subsidy program induces a welfare improvement for the host country if it is offered to all domestic producers instead of foreign producers only in the host country.     

When Do Qualitative Risk Disclosures Backfire? The Effects of a Mismatch in Hedge Disclosure Formats on Investors' Judgments

Disclosure standards mandate the quantitative disclosure of hedging‐instrument‐related risks but not the disclosure of hedged‐item‐related risks. We examine how a match (mismatch) in formats, caused by making quantitative (qualitative) hedged item disclosures alongside quantitative hedging instrument disclosures, affects investors' integration of information from these two related disclosures. Our first experiment varies the hedged item disclosure format (quantitative or qualitative) and the portion of risk hedged (small or large). We find that when disclosure formats are mismatched, the less comparable nature of the two disclosures caused investors to neglect the offsetting relationship when assessing net risks. As a result, risk and investment judgments were influenced by the more prominent quantitative hedging instrument disclosures. Our second experiment finds that the use of a qualitative debiaser that clarifies the relationship between the two disclosures led to the integration of information and mitigated this effect.     

Ag econ angst crisis revisited

The present paper was inspired by and is a response to the Rola-Rubzen, Hardaker and Dillon paper 'Agricultural economists and world poverty: progress and prospects' (Rola-Rubzen et al. 2001). It is agreed that the position of agricultural economists in foreign aid and poverty programs has declined over recent decades. Such a feeling of guilt and remorse expressed by the above authors does indeed create considerable 'angst'. A major reason for this state of affairs lies in 'the flavour of the month' approach of the development agencies. These include women in development, gender-based farming systems research, household nutrition and food security, people participation, and targeting the poorest of the poor. These fads have driven disciplinary considerations to the wall and the more widely-defined objectives have reduced the drive for economic efficiency. We argue there is still a place for better designed and delivered assistance programs within the wider framework of assistance that has become fashionable. Greater application of institutional principles in both the political processes associated with assistance and the implementation agencies would improve the outcomes of many projects. Particular attention would need to be given to the interface between the development agencies and recipient governments. The present paper picks up on the market failure aspects of agriculture's rather poor contribution to development, and develops a wider perspective in terms of the new institutional economics and a continuing role for the agricultural economist.