Minimum Quality Standards under Asymmetric Duopoly with Endogenous Quality Ordering: A Note

In this note, we revisit minimum quality standards (MQS) under a vertically differentiated duopoly. We generalize the model in Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) by introducing asymmetry into the fixed cost of quality improvement and by explicitly taking into account the endogeneity of quality ordering. In the generalized model, we show that the results derived by Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) are largely robust.     

Russia: Firm entry and survival barriers

Why are there so few new firms in Russia? This paper provides further insights into the specific Russian business landscape and how it impacts the low level of new firm entry. As this paper indicates, internationally comparative data do not provide many clues, since in terms of purely formal constraints Russia fares comparatively well. However, a deeper analysis uncovers the informal impediments associated with the lack of rule of law, inconsistent enforcement of regulations, regional autonomy and pervasive corruption. These informal constraints form impediments not only for new firm creation but also for firm survival and firm exit.     

Competition in a Dynamic Auction Market: Identification,Structural Estimation,and Market Efficiency

The model incorporates an infinite series of auctions for identical items (or close substitutes) ordered over time and bidders with unit demand. The participants of each auction are drawn from a dynamic pool, with losing bidders remaining in the pool of potential bidders. The number of bidders in each auction is unobservable. Risk‐neutral, forward‐looking bidders submit bids below valuation. A novel identification and estimation strategy is used to estimate the valuation distribution from an order statistic of the bids. The model is used to evaluate the efficiency of online auctions for a 60GB Apple iPod Video, compared to a perfect‐competition benchmark.     

A Note on the Endogenous Timing of Tariff Policy in the Presence of a Time Lag between Production and Trade Decisions

Using the Hamilton–Slutsky extended endogenous timing game of observable delay framework, we analyze the endogenous timing of tariff policy in the presence of a time lag between production and trade decisions. In particular, focusing on the strategic relationships between an importing country’s government and an exporting monopoly firm, we show that a natural Stackelberg situation exists in which the importing country’s government as first mover determines the tariff rate and the exporting monopoly firm as second mover determines the production level. We also find that the natural Stackelberg equilibrium is Pareto superior to both the Nash and alternative Stackelberg equilibria. This implies that commitment to an ex ante optimal tariff policy before the production decision is made is optimal for the affected parties.     

A Note on Quality Choice,Monopoly, and Network Externality

Introducing network externalities into a model of vertically differentiated products, Lambertini and Orsini (2001, 2003) analyze the implications of a monopolist’s quality choice for social optimum. Moreover, they examine how the network externality affects quality, quantity, price, and social surplus. In this note, by looking at the nature of cost functions and the degree of network externalities, we reconsider their results, at least some of which depend upon the specificity of the cost functions.      

Strategic Investment Subsidies under Asymmetric Oligopoly

This paper examines strategic investment subsidies in an international oligopoly. A general oligopoly model is constructed in which firms compete in two stages and governments commit to investment subsidies prior to firms' actions. The paper considers asymmetry among firms that arises from the nature of goods they produce rather than their cost structures. When firms produce asymmetrically differentiated goods, it is found that a change in the number of foreign competitors may alter the sign of the optimal unilateral investment subsidy. An example of policy reversal is provided in the case of strategic research and development subsidies for a quality‐differentiated industry.     

Agricultural Land Conversion and Inheritence Tax in Japan

In this paper we investigate theoretically the extent to which the development timing of agricultural land conversion would be hastened by the introduction of inheritence tax. We extend the optimal timing of wealth maximizing value use models by Scouras (1978), Anderson (1993) and Kanemoto (1996) to examine cases where tax rates vary according to land use with (i) almost no income and (ii) high income use, such as rental housing. We first model landowner's behavior within the life cycle dynamic optimization framework and then simulate the impact of inheritence tax on the optimal timing of development. Some notable predictions about optimal timing of development emerge from our numerical analysis: no inheritence tax effect is observed for landowners whose inheritence probability is less than 1% (that is, landowners in the age group 40 or below) and whose inheritence tax rate is less than 10%. However, the optimal timing of development drops to below one year for landowners whose inheritence probability is more than 18% and whose tax rate is 30%.     

Product Market Competition in Transition Economies: Increasing Varieties and Consumer Loyalty

This paper analyzes product market competition between foreign entrants and former SOEs in transition markets with respect to expansion of product variety and consumer loyalty formation. While the market share motive induces the more efficient foreign entrant to price aggressively, the extent of this behavior depends critically on its relative efficiency vis-à-vis the local incumbent. If the efficiency gap exceeds some threshold value, the entrant exploits increasingly its cost advantages by raising price rather than investing in market share. Our result suggests that immediate restructuring of former SOEs is important to realize fully the competitive benefits of opening local markets.J. Comp. Econom., December 2000, 28(4), pp. 700–715. International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20431.     

A Note on Strategic Trade Policy and Endogenous Quality Choice*

This paper shows that some of the main policy implications in Park (2001 ) and Zhou, Spencer, and Vertinsky (2002 ) are sensitive to their assumptions on marginal production costs. The unilaterally optimal policy for investment towards quality improvement is analyzed, assuming constant and non‐negative marginal production costs under vertically differentiated international duopoly. If marginal production costs are different across firms, the optimal policy for each exporting country may be opposite in its sign from that shown by the existing papers under Bertrand competition. The policy reversal may also occur for the low‐quality exporting country under Cournot competition.