Loan commitments and the management of uncertain credit demand

We provide an explanation for loan commitments unrelated to borrower creditworthiness. In our model, banks can use loan commitments to reduce uncertainty regarding their own future funding needs. Given a cost advantage to banks that can acquire such information, there exists an equilibrium demand for commitments by riskneutral firms. The purchase of the loan commitment and the choice of contract terms reveals the buyer's private information regarding future credit needs. In order to ensure the sorting of the a priori indistinguishable applicants according to their private information, we show that a usage fee applied to the commitment holder's unused credit line is necessary.     

Impact of prosocial motivation on organizational citizenship behavior: the mediating role of ethical leadership and leader–member exchange

Quality & Quantity - This study empirically examined how ethical leadership and leader-member exchange mediates the relationship between prosocial motivation and organizational citizenship...     

Experimental Tests of Self-Selection and Screening in Insurance Decisions

A major characteristic of insurance markets is information asymmetry that may lead to phenomena such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Another aspect of markets with asymmetric information is self-selection, which refers to the pattern of choices that individuals with different personal characteristics make when facing a menu of contracts or options. To combat problems of asymmetric information, insurance firms can use screening. That is, they can offer the clients a menu of choices and infer their characteristics from their choices.This article reports the results of several studies that examined the degree to which people behave according to the notions of self-selection and screening. Subjects played the role of either insurance buyers or sellers. The results of these studies provide partial support for the hypothesis that subjects use self-selection and screening in insurance markets. Our study also points at the importance of learning in experimental studies. In one-stage experiments where subjects did not get feedback, screening was not detected. When multistage experiments were conducted, and the subjects learned from experience and were also taught the relevant theories, their decisions were more aligned with screening.     

Asymmetric information and deal selection: evidence from the Italian venture capital market

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - The aim of this study is to show how information asymmetry affects the venture capital (VC) deal selection process in the Italian capital...     

PARTIAL EXERCISE OF LOAN COMMITMENTS UNDER ADAPTIVE PRICING

The partial takedown phenomenon associated with bank loan commitments is examined in a dynamic context in which banks adjust commitment prices to client takedown behavior. The optimal takedown is an increasing function of client riskiness and a decreasing function of the time the client plans to remain with its present bank and the cost of switching to a new bank. Since the bank's learning is cumulative, the longer a client remains with its bank the smaller is the commitment price adjustment resulting from an aberrant takedown. The enhanced commitment price certainty, obtained with longevity of the client relationship, helps to explain client reluctance to switch banks. Since the optimal takedown is an increasing function of client riskiness under adaptive pricing, such pricing may serve the added purpose of providing information on client risk.     

Optimal strike prices of stock options for effort-averse executives

This paper evaluates the common practice of setting the strike prices of executive option plans at-the-money. Hall and Murphy [Hall, Brian, Murphy, Kevin J., 2000. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options. American Economic Review 90 (2), 209–214] claim this practice to be optimal since it maximizes the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance. However, they do not incorporate effort and the possibility that managers are effort-averse into their model. We revisit this question while explicitly introducing these factors and allowing the reward package to include fixed wages, options, and stock grants. We simulate the manager’s effort choice and compensation as well as the value of shareholders’ equity under alternative compensation schemes, and identify schemes that are optimal. Our simulations indicate that, when abstracting from tax considerations, it is optimal to award managers with options that will most likely be highly valuable (i.e., substantially in-the-money) on their expiration date. Prior to 2006, the tax code and financial reporting standards provided incentives to award options that are closer to the money when issued than the options that were optimal in the absence of these considerations. Recent tax and reporting changes voided these incentives and thus we predict that these changes will induce firms to issue options with lower strike prices than those that were issued prior to 2006.     

Adaptive credit granting policies

We analyze here the optimal interest rate determination of a bank that learns about the repayment behavior of its customers from their past behavior. Optimal dynamic methods are first suggested for determining the interest rate for a bank that learns about the probability of default of its borrowers. It is shown that such a bank determines lower than or equal interest rates than a bank that does not adapt its probability of default according to its past experience. Similar results also obtain when the bank learns about the probabilities that its borrowers belong to each of K (K larger than 2) quality groups.     

The determinants of bond call premia: A signalling approach

A signalling model is presented that provides an additional explanation for the determination of call premia on corporate bonds. It is shown that firms may signal their exclusive information about their probability of default by the choice of their call premia. Stockholders of safer firms (i.e., those that have a lower probability of bankruptcy) have a higher incentive for providing a low call premium. This occurs because the call option will be valuable only if the firm survives by the first call date. This event, however, is more likely for the safer firm. The safer firm will therefore be more willing to sacrifice some current revenues (or equivalently, to provide a higher coupon than it would otherwise have to pay in order to sell the bond at par) by determining a lower call premium. The model therefore predicts a negative correlation between safety and call premia, a correlation that has been empirically confirmed by Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989). This correlation provides support to the signalling theory vis-à-vis the alternative explanation of taxes determining the call premia. Another contribution of this model is that it ties the call premium decision with expectations of future interest rates. Such expectations are considered important by practitioners, but were rarely considered in previous research.