Career Concerns and Resource Allocation in Conglomerates

We investigate resource allocation decisions in conglomerateswhen managers are motivated by career concerns. When divisionalcash flows are differentially informative about managerial ability,we show that it is in the managers' interest to overallocateunobservable intangible resources to the more informative divisions.Anticipating this bias, it is optimal for the firm's ownersto also overallocate observable capital to the more informativedivisions. The model provides rationale for corporate socialismand corporate hedging. It also highlights a cost of segmentreporting and tracking stocks, namely, that they allow managersto distort their perceived ability at the expense of investors.     

Bargaining and brinkmanship : Capital structure choice by regulated firms

A bargaining model of regulation is developed. It is shown that regulated firms can improve their bargaining positions and induce the regulator to set higher prices for firm output by choosing more debt. Firms, in choosing an optimal level of debt, trade off this bargaining advantage against expected bankruptcy costs. The model predicts that firms would tend to choose higher levels of debt in harsher regulatory environments. This prediction is shown to be consistent with cross-sectional evidence for U.S. electric utilities for the sample period 1972–1983.     

DO INSTITUTIONS PREFER HIGH‐VALUE ACQUIRERS? AN ANALYSIS OF TRADING IN STOCK‐FINANCED ACQUISITIONS

If owners of target shares in a stock‐for‐stock merger perceive the acquirer as overvalued, they should sell their holdings more aggressively to profit before such overvaluation dissipates. We study institutional owners of targets and find that slightly more than half liquidate their shares in stock mergers, consistent with high institutional‐share turnover rates found in the prior literature. However, share retention is higher when valuation measures suggest greater acquirer overvaluation, regardless of whether institutional owners generally prefer growth or value stock. Institutions that prefer large‐cap, growth stock are most enthusiastic about bids from large, high‐valuation acquirers, and substantially increase their stakes in such deals.     

Tender Offers, Proxy Contests, and Large-Shareholder Activism

The paper analyzes tender offers and proxy contests as alternative means of resolving corporate governance conflicts between dissidents and incumbent management. We show that when a dissident shareholder is sufficiently confident about the potential benefits from changing corporate policy, he will seek majority control by making a tender offer rather than initiating a proxy contest. When the dissident is relatively uninformed, however, he may opt for a proxy contest, thereby utilizing the information of other shareholders to implement the better policy. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that announcements of tender offers will tend to be associated with larger positive stockprice reactions than announcements of proxy contests. The model is easily extended to allow for promanagement bias in proxy voting by institutional investors. Empirical observations that have been viewed as evidence of such promanagement bias are shown to be quite consistent with the absence of such bias. Policy issues are discussed as well. An interesting result is that even policies targeted at reducing the costs of conducting proxy contests may have ambiguous social consequences, given the possibility of substitution between tender offers and proxy contests.     

Teaching information technology alongside business analytics: Case study

Business analytics can be described as the statistical analysis of data to make decisions and meaningful conclusions. As the demand to advance the curriculum of undergraduate business education increases, courses in business analytics aim to provide students with fundamental skills in critical thinking. Educators have found that spreadsheet applications that include statistical features are easy to use and facilitate student learning. The authors analyzed student performance in an introductory business analytics course that used Microsoft Excel as a statistical tool by comparing scores from this introductory course with those from an information technology course in which only Excel skills were learned.     

The iron cage exposed: Institutional pressures and heterogeneity across the healthcare supply chain

The healthcare industry has been known to operate in a strong institutional environment (i.e. government regulations), and the implementation of inter-organizational systems (IOS) has followed an institutional process. Extending this perspective across different tiers in the healthcare supply chain, we investigate how organizations in different tiers in the supply chain (i.e. hospitals, distributors and manufacturers) respond to institutional pressures when implementing IOS. How institutional dynamics unfold across multiple tiers of a supply chain is an uncharted area of research, and we take the theory-building case study approach using data collected from ten organizations. Because organizations are embedded in their respective tiers, our within-tier analyses are equivalent to cross-organization analyses. In this regard, the cross-case analyses occur at two different levels: at each tier level (i.e. across multiple hospitals, multiple distributors and multiple manufacturers) and across the supply chain (i.e. across all three tiers). The study shows how different institutional pressures such as coercive, mimetic, and normative manifest across the tiers. It also demonstrates how a differential mix of endogenous and institutional pressures lead to mixed organizational responses across the tiers. The propositions developed from the study enrich institutional theory arguments within the information systems and supply chain management disciplines. They highlight how the IOS implementation dynamics within and across different tiers in a supply chain result in heterogeneous rather than isomorphic consequences, thereby exposing the “iron cage” of institutionalization.     

LEARNING MATTERS: REAPPRAISING OBJECT ALLOCATION RULES WHEN AGENTS STRATEGICALLY INVESTIGATE

Individuals form preferences through search, interviews, discussion, and investigation. In a stylized object allocation model, we characterize the equilibrium learning strategies induced by different allocation rules and trace their welfare consequences. Our analysis reveals that top trading cycles rules dominate serial priority rules under inequality‐averse measures of social welfare.     

Taking stock or cashing in? Shareholder style preferences,premiums and the method of payment

We develop and test hypotheses on the impact of target shareholders' investment style preferences on the method of payment and premiums in acquisitions. Stock offers (unlike cash offers) allow target shareholders to defer capital gains taxes. This deferral value, however, depends on target shareholders' willingness to retain acquirer stock. The empirical findings support our hypotheses. Bid premiums in stock offers are negatively and jointly related to target shareholder tax liabilities and to variables proxying for target shareholder willingness to hold acquirer stock. Moreover, the difference between predicted cash and stock premiums due to these factors significantly explains the method of payment choice.     

Brand as Promise

Journal of Business Ethics - Brands are widely regarded as a constellation of shared associations surrounding a company and its offerings. On the traditional view of brands, these associations are...     

Enterprise Resource Planning Systems Implementation in a Global Subsidiary Organization: Lessons Learned

This article describes the implementation of an enterprise resource planning (ERP) implemented by British Petroleum (BP) Worldwide, from the perspective of one of its subsidiary organizations, BP Singapore. The ERP solution, an internally developed system, was implemented globally by BP worldwide quite successfully from a global perspective, though not without challenges at the local level. This study examines the process of implementing a global ERP solution at the local subsidiaries, and the unique problems that may be encountered in force-fitting a global solution at the local level. Among the issues and problems experienced by the subsidiary are higher-than-anticipated costs, longer development times, lack of technical expertise, and compromises in business processes. The findings of the study could be helpful in formulating coping mechanisms in implementing global ERP solutions.