The Impact of Regret on Exports

We examine optimal production and export decisions of a firm facing exchange rate uncertainty, where the firm's management is not only risk averse but also regret averse, i.e., is characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex post suboptimal alternatives. Experimental and empirical results support the view that managers tend to be regret averse. Under regret aversion a negative risk premium need not preclude the firm from exporting which would be the case if the firm were only risk averse. Exporting creates an implicit hedge against the possibility of regret when the realized spot exchange rate turns out to be high. The regret‐averse firm as such has a greater ex ante incentive to export than the purely risk averse firm. Finally, we use a two‐state example to illustrate that the firm optimally exports more (less) to the foreign country than in the case of pure risk aversion if the low (high) spot exchange rate is more likely to prevail. Regret aversion as such plays a crucial role in determining the firm's optimal allocation between domestic sales and foreign exports.     

Export and Strategic Currency Hedging

This paper examines an international Cournot duopoly wherein a home firm and a foreign firm compete in the home market under exchange rate uncertainty. The foreign exporting firm, being risk averse, has incentives to hedge its exchange rate risk exposure. In a two-stage setting, we show that hedging via an unbiased currency futures market acts as a strategic device. In particular, under either constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, an increase in the hedging volume of the foreign firm promotes its exports and deters the home firm’s output. In contrast to the well-known full-hedging result in a perfectly competitive environment, we find that the foreign firm over-hedges for strategic reasons. Furthermore, the separation result from the hedging literature under perfect competition no longer holds in our duopoly framework, i.e., equilibrium output levels depend on the risk attitude of the foreign firm as well as the probability distribution of the spot exchange rate.     

A note on the time inconsistency of strategic trade policy

In a simple three-stage model of an international Cournot duopoly, optimal strategic trade policy is shown to be time inconsistent. If the domestic government first announces a production subsidy, firms then irrevocably commit resources to R&D, and finally play their output game, there is an incentive for the government to revise its ex ante optimal policy once R&D decisions have been made. If private agents anticipate this revision and if the government does not have the power to commit itself to the ex ante optimal policy, a credibility constraint has to be imposed.     

Pflegeverträge prüfen!

Vertr?ge richtig gestalten – Zahlreiche Vertragsklauseln in Pflegevertr?gen wurden nach Klagen des Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverbands gerichtlich für unwirksam erkl?rt. Pflegeanbieter, die sich davor schützen wollen, sollten ihre Pflegevertr?ge auf den Prüfstand stellen. Auf welche Punkte kommt es dabei besonders an?     

Technology and Cost Efficiency in Universal Banking A “Thick Frontier”-Analysis of the German Banking Industry

Using 1992 data of 1490 banks covering about 40% of German banking, we specify a multi-product translog cost function and follow the thick frontier-approach to control for cost inefficiency when evaluating the technology of banking. Scale economies are found to exist up to a size of about 5 billion DM of total assets, with diseconomies being caused by non-operating costs. There is hardly any evidence of economies of scope. Compared to cost inefficiency external factors play a surprisingly strong role in explaining cost differences between high-cost and low-cost banks. Smaller banks turn out to be more responsive to input prices.     

An‘s Bett gefesselt

Wann sind freiheitsentziehende Ma?nahmen erlaubt? – Die Gefahr, dass Pflegebedürftige stürzen und sich verletzen oder Demenzkranke orientierungslos die Wohnung verlassen, ist im Pflegealltag allgegenw?rtig. Solche Ereignisse gilt es zu verhindern – aber: Bauchgurte oder Bettgitter dürfen nicht ohne weiteres eingesetzt werden.     

Mergers Among German Cooperative Banks: A Panel-based Stochastic Frontier Analysis

Based on an unbalanced panel of all Bavarian cooperative banks for the years of 1989--97, which includes information on 283 mergers, we analyze motives and cost effects of small-scale mergers in German banking. Estimating a frontier cost function with a time-variable stochastic efficiency term, we show that positive scale and scope effects from a merger arise only if the merged unit closes part of the former branch network. When we compare actual mergers to a simulation of hypothetical mergers, size effects of observed mergers turn out to be slightly more favorable than for all possible mergers. Banks taken over by others are less efficient than the average bank in the same size class, but exhibit, on average, the same efficiency as the acquiring firms. For the post-merger phase, our empirical results provide no evidence for efficiency gains from merging, but point instead to a leveling off of differences among the merging units.     

STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY WITH INTERNATIONALLY OWNED FIRMS*

The consequences of international firm ownership for strategic trade policy are examined both in a general and in a simple linear model of an international duopoly with two governments using production subsidies as policy instruments. At first sight, the case for strategic trade policy seems to be weakened, because international ownership reduces a government's incentive for rent-shifting. Closer inspection shows, however, that there are ownership structures leading to optimal policies which induce the duopolists to behave more collusively. This tends to resolve the conflict between national and international rationality in a policy game with retaliation and makes strategic trade policy look more attractive.