Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors

We survey institutional investors to better understand their role in the corporate governance of firms. Consistent with a number of theories, we document widespread behind‐the‐scenes intervention as well as governance‐motivated exit. These governance mechanisms are viewed as complementary devices, with intervention typically occurring prior to a potential exit. We further find that long‐term investors and investors that are less concerned about stock liquidity intervene more intensively. Finally, we find that most investors use proxy advisors and believe that the information provided by such advisors improves their own voting decisions.     

TRENDS IN AMERICAN LIVING STANDARDS AND INEQUALITY, 1959–2007

We analyze the trends from 1959 to 2007 using an expanded measure of income called the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well‐Being (LIMEW). LIMEW is different in scope from the official U.S. Census Bureau measure of gross money income (MI) in that our measure includes non‐cash transfers, public consumption, imputed income from wealth, and household production and nets out personal taxes. While the annual growth rates of median LIMEW and MI are very close over the whole period (0.67 and 0.63 percent), median LIMEW grew much faster than median MI after 1982 and much slower before. The Gini coefficient of MI is uniformly higher than that of LIMEW but both show about the same change from 1959 to 2007. Decomposition analysis shows that changes in inequality are driven to a large extent by non‐home wealth in LIMEW and earnings in MI. While the racial gap in MI declined somewhat over the 1990s and 2000s, the racial gap in LIMEW actually widened a bit. Over the same years, while there was little change in the gap in MI between the elderly and non‐elderly, the LIMEW of the elderly actually overtook that of the non‐elderly.     

Opening the Black Box: Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Power

We analyze the internal capital markets of a multinational conglomerate, using a unique panel data set of planned and actual allocations to business units and a survey of unit CEOs. Following cash windfalls, more powerful managers obtain larger allocations and increase investment substantially more than their less connected peers. We identify cash windfalls as a source of misallocation of capital, as more powerful managers overinvest and their units exhibit lower ex post performance and productivity. These findings contribute to our understanding of frictions in resource allocation within firms and point to an important channel through which power may lead to inefficiencies.     

COINTEGRATION AND CHANGES IN REGIME: THE JAPANESE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION

In this paper we examine a model of cointegration where long-run parameters are subject to switching between several different cointegrating regimes. These shifts are allowed to be governed by the outcome of an unobserved Markov chain with unknown transition probabilities. We illustrate this approach using Japanese data on consumption and disposable income, and find that the data favour a Markov-switching long-run relationship over a standard temporally stable formulation. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm-Level Climate Change Exposure

We develop a method that identifies the attention paid by earnings call participants to firms' climate change exposures. The method adapts a machine learning keyword discovery algorithm and captures exposures related to opportunity, physical, and regulatory shocks associated with climate change. The measures are available for more than 10,000 firms from 34 countries between 2002 and 2020. We show that the measures are useful in predicting important real outcomes related to the net-zero transition, in particular, job creation in disruptive green technologies and green patenting, and that they contain information that is priced in options and equity markets.