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KAZUO OGAWA 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2007,39(1):241-257
We investigated, empirically, why Japanese banks held excess reserves in the late 1990s. Specifically, we pin down two factors explaining the demand for excess reserves: a low short-term interest rate, or call rate, and the fragile financial health of banks. The virtually zero call rate increased the demand for excess reserves substantially, and a high bad loans ratio largely contributed to the increase in excess reserve holdings. We found that the holdings of excess reserves would fall by two-thirds if the call rate were to be raised to its level prior to the adoption of the zero-interest-rate policy, and the bad loans ratio were to fall by 50%. 相似文献
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The paper considers a small, fully employed economy with non-tradeables, securities, and money. The paper first analyzes the effects of devaluation and financial controls in the short-run equilibrium on the trade balance, the capital account, and the overall balance of payments. Disequilibria in the capital account and the overall balance of payments cause changes in the stock of securities and money, shifting the short-run equilibrium. The paper investigates the condition for the- uniqueness and stability of the long-run equilibrium under this adjustment process (‘specie flow mechanism’). Finally, the long-run equilibrium effects of devaluation and monetary policies are examined. 相似文献
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By incorporating a multinational private firm into the mixed duopoly model with Hotelling‐type spatial competition, we show that the private firm's nationality is a matter of the public firm's location. As the share of foreign capital increases in the private (multinational) firm, the public firm moves to a central place. The effects of price regulation and sequential location choice are also discussed. 相似文献
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We investigate a mixed duopoly where a state‐owned public enterprise competes against a profit‐maximising private enterprise. We analyse whether private leadership or public leadership is robust in the observable delay game. We find that private leadership is always risk dominant. We also investigate how ownership structure in a public firm affects the equilibrium distribution of roles. We find that the roles are as follows: (1) Cournot, when the degree of privatisation is low, (2) private leadership, when it is middle, (3) both private leadership and public leadership, when it is high. The result implies that private leadership is again more robust. 相似文献
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