Devaluation,Capital Mobility,and Long-Run Equilibrium*

The paper considers a small, fully employed economy with non-tradeables, securities, and money. The paper first analyzes the effects of devaluation and financial controls in the short-run equilibrium on the trade balance, the capital account, and the overall balance of payments. Disequilibria in the capital account and the overall balance of payments cause changes in the stock of securities and money, shifting the short-run equilibrium. The paper investigates the condition for the- uniqueness and stability of the long-run equilibrium under this adjustment process (‘specie flow mechanism’). Finally, the long-run equilibrium effects of devaluation and monetary policies are examined.     

ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF PRIVATE LEADERSHIP IN MIXED DUOPOLY

We investigate a mixed duopoly where a state‐owned public enterprise competes against a profit‐maximising private enterprise. We analyse whether private leadership or public leadership is robust in the observable delay game. We find that private leadership is always risk dominant. We also investigate how ownership structure in a public firm affects the equilibrium distribution of roles. We find that the roles are as follows: (1) Cournot, when the degree of privatisation is low, (2) private leadership, when it is middle, (3) both private leadership and public leadership, when it is high. The result implies that private leadership is again more robust.     

On the Long-Run Growth Effects of a Minimum Wage for a Two-Sector Economy*

This paper investigates the effect of (nationally enforced) minimum wage regulation on economic growth using the standard two-sector model. The paper shows, inter alia. that the minimum wage regulation (if it is effective) always lowers the rate of growth by inducing over-capitalization in the economy, and that a minimum wage poor which is sufficiently high causes the economy to decay continually. A diagrammatical exposition of some of the results is also provided.     

WHY IS JAPANESE WORKING TIME SO LONG?: WAGE-WORKING TIME CONTRACT MODELS*

Wage-working time contract models are used to analyse factors which can account for the long working hours of Japanese males. Although there are many factors which affect working time, our simulation shows that the clear gender division of labour in Japanese households is the most important. The simulation also shows that the wage gap and working time gap between large and small companies are explained mainly by the difference in the company's monopoly power, the worker's ability and the union's bargaining power. Moreover, if working time is not a bargaining issue and is determined by employers, it is longer than the case where it is a bargaining issue.     

TECHNOLOGY CHOICE AND ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS IN A TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT CONTEXT*

Assuming that an environmentally‐friendly technology not only reduces pollution emissions but also strengthens the preference of consumers for goods produced with such a technology, we show that a legally stipulated choice of cleaner technologies, requiring resources and hence reducing output, can improve the welfare of the economy even when other economies do not choose such technologies, and that the driving force can be the terms‐of‐trade effect. Therefore, even a unilateral regulation on the choice of technology would be approved in the economy when the environmental awareness of consumers is sufficiently raised.