A MACROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE OF AFTA'S PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the impressive economic performance of most of its members have increased the weight of the region's views in world fora. However, ASEAN has been unsuccessful in fostering a regional integration arrangement (RIA) leading to an increase in intraregional trade and foreign direct investment. In January 1992, ASEAN launched the Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA) seeking to establish a free trade area (FTA) by 2008.
Market integration increases economic interdependence and thereby raises the need for policy integration and discipline. This paper argues that a number of difficulties that ASEAN faced in promoting intraregional trade are likely to continue to affect AFTA (e.g., low economic complementarity and macroeconomic imbalances requiring large changes in equilibrium real exchange rates). The experience of other RIAs suggests other potential problems.
AFTA's prospects of evolving into deeper forms of sustainable integration are remote. Some cooperation in areas of common interest seems likely.     

Exchange Rate Policy: Is this where we came in?

In the second issue of Economic Outlook (April 1977) we published an article entitled "Why the exchange rate must be set free". In this Viewpoint we recall the arguments we presented then and consider their relevance to the present debate about exchange rate policy. We conclude that circumstances now are rather different from those in 1977 and that the choice between monetary targeting and exchange rate targeting is not as simple as it appeared then. Nevertheless we do believe that in the circumstances of recent month it was correct to let the exchange rate rise above its unofficial "ceiling" of DM3 rather than to pursue a specific exchange rate target.     

Tightening the Fiscal and Monetary Controls

The Medium-Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) is a new departure in post-war policy-making. As David Smith's Briefing Paper shows the ideas behind it are well rooted in historical experience, but nevertheless it was inevitable that there would be a major element of trial and error in the early years of its use. The experience of 1980-81 however has produced some alarming results. The monetary limits have been drastically exceeded and the PSBR is likely to be far above the original target. There are two possible explanations. Either the control system is gravely defective or the government has deliberately followed the kind of short-term discretionary policies (and has indulged in the kind of ad hoc interventionism) which the strategy was expressly designed to avoid. We believe that both explanations are true. It is also probable that they reinforced each other. The first year of the strategy was likely to be the year of greatest strain. It involved a highly ambitious attempt to reduce inflation at a time when cost pressures from wages and higher energy prices were particularly strong. The strains rapidly revealed the defects in the control system. Since the government was alarmed at the short-term consequences of its policies, it chose to make a virtue of necessity and in effect suspended its commitment to the control of sterling M3. It is possible to look back at 1980 and to say that, in the event, the government's loss of control over its policies was justified as statesmanlike flexibility. But there always appear to be good reasons for sacrificing long-term objectives for short-term expediency. The MTFS was intended to avoid the chronic tendency to accept the easy option. It is essential that in 1981 the commitment to the MTFS should be re-established and that it should be reinforced, as appears to be necessary, by a system of indicators and controls to ensure that the errors of 1980 are not repeated. Otherwise there is a serious risk that the hard-won gains in the fight against inflation will be lost in the economic upturn. In the first part of this Viewpoint we examine what happened to fiscal and monetary policy in 1980 and discuss the general lines that policy should follow in 1981-82. We conclude that in order to get fiscal policy back on course the authorities should aim for a PSBR of £10 bn in 1981-82. In the second part we discuss in more detail the reasons why monetary policy went so badly astray in 1980, focusing particularly on the role of the Bank of England. We argue that just as ‘dirty floating’ (i.e. the pursuit of exchange rate objectives) may threaten the monetary targets, so ‘dirty monetarism’ (i.e. the pursuit of interest rate objectives) may prove an even greater threat. We conclude that the discretionary activities of the Bank of England contributed to the excessive monetary growth in 1980, and that it is necessary to ensure that in future the Bank should conduct its policy on a non-discretionary basis.     

Cross‐Border Auction Cycle Effects of Sovereign Bond Issuance in the Euro Area

We provide evidence for the euro area of spillovers from foreign public debt auctions into domestic secondary‐market auction cycles. We also confirm existing evidence of such spillovers from domestic issues into the domestic secondary market. Consistent with a theory of primary dealers’ limited risk‐bearing capacity, we find that auction cycles from domestic issues are stronger during the recent crisis period, whereas cross‐border effects are stronger in the precrisis period, but this evidence is not strong. This finding likely reflects the opposing effects of reduced sovereign bond market integration during the crisis and higher yield covariances caused by more market volatility.     

Political Connections and the Informativeness of Insider Trades

We analyze the trading of corporate insiders at leading financial institutions during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis. We find strong evidence of a relation between political connections and informed trading during the period in which Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds were disbursed, and that the relation is most pronounced among corporate insiders with recent direct connections. Notably, we find evidence of abnormal trading by politically connected insiders 30 days in advance of TARP infusions, and that these trades anticipate the market reaction to the infusion. Our results suggest that political connections can facilitate opportunistic behavior by corporate insiders.     

Partial Regulation in Vertically Differentiated Industries

We provide theoretical foundations for quality‐adjusted price‐cap regulation in industries where a regulated incumbent and an unregulated entrant offer vertically differentiated products competing in price and quality. We show that, whether or not the incumbent anticipates the reaction of the entrant, the optimal weights in the cap depend upon the market served by the entrant, despite the latter not being directly concerned by regulation. We further show that the cap is robust to small errors in the weights. Our findings point to the conclusion that, in partially regulated industries, regulators should use information about the whole sectors rather than on the sole regulated incumbents.     

Depression dynamics: a new estimate of the Anglo‐American manufacturing productivity gap in the interwar period1

During the interwar period the manufacturing productivity gap between the US and the UK became much larger than existing estimates suggest. In this article a new comparison of US/UK productivity levels for 1935 is presented, utilizing a more rigorous methodology to revise the widely used, but methodologically outdated, benchmark comparison by Rostas that was published in 1948. Secondly, the comparison is extended to take account of variations in input prices, and it is shown that double deflation has a substantial effect on the new benchmark, particularly at the industry level. Thirdly, labour input is adjusted for actual hours worked. US manufacturing displayed a much higher level of comparative productivity for the key industries of the second industrial revolution, such as chemicals and engineering. These results support revisionist accounts of the depression's strengthening of US productivity leadership.