The Demise of Investment Banking Partnerships: Theory and Evidence

In 1970 the New York Stock Exchange relaxed rules that prohibited the public incorporation of member firms. Investment banking concerns went public in waves, with Goldman Sachs the last of the bulge bracket banks to float. We explain the pattern of investment bank flotations. We argue that partnerships foster the formation of human capital and we use technological advances that undermine the role of human capital to explain the partnership's going‐public decision. We support our theory using a new data set of investment bank partnership statistics.     

The Bank Capital Decision: A Time Series—Cross Section Analysis

This paper seeks to explain the dramatic decline in capital to asset ratios in U.S. commercial banks during the last two decades. It is hypothesized that the rise in nominal interest rates during this period might have contributed substantially to the fall in capital ratios. Time series-cross section estimation supports the hypothesis regarding the interest rate.     

Towards a Unifying Model of Systems of Law, Corporate Financing, Accounting and Corporate Governance

Several authors have observed a relationship between a country's type of legal system and its style of financial reporting. Generally, the causality is presumed to be from legal system to accounting system. However, one model of accounting differences suggests that the type of accounting is an influence on the regulatory system rather than vice versa. This helps to explain why the Netherlands has Roman law but approximately Anglo-Saxon accounting. It also allows for the extensive use by European companies of US or international rules. This paper expands on these themes, and extends the model to include corporate governance.     

One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing

We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners.     

Workfare in an efficiency wage model

The impacts of introducing work requirements for welfare recipients are studied in an efficiency wage model. If the workfare package is not mandatory, it will reduce employment, profits, and utility levels of employed and unemployed workers. In contrast, mandatory effort requirements will generally raise both employment and profits and reduce the tax rate. The impact on the net wage is ambiguous. Changes of utility levels of employed and unemployed workers have the same sign as the variation in the net wage. The possibility of a Pareto improvement may explain the widespread support for welfare to work experiments.